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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this booklet is to provide a brief overview of some of the issues involved in the 1982-83 high school debate resolutions, which focus on the defense commitments of the United States. The first of the booklet's four chapters provides a review of information sources for use in researching the topic of defense commitments. The remaining three chapters discuss the debate topics: (1) that the United States should significantly alter its nuclear weapons policy, (2) that the United States should significantly reduce its commitment to NATO, and (3) that the United States should significantly curtail its arms sales to other countries. The booklet also provides a section of notes for each topic, as well as selected bibliographies on each topic. (FL)

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# ERIC First Analysis: National Defense Commitments

## 1982–83 National High School Debate Resolutions

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# Foreword

*ERIC First Analysis*, published annually since 1973, provides debaters with guidelines for research on the debate resolutions selected by the National University Extension Association's Committee on Discussion and Debate. Periodic surveys of teachers of debate have indicated that *First Analysis* has proved to be an excellent resource for students in their study of issues and arguments. It incorporates an instructional approach designed to avoid "pat" cases and "canned" evidence.

Because these three debate resolutions need to be answered in each decade, debaters will be applying their attitudes and insights into national defense policy issues many times in their adult life. The student who debates the arms sales topic will need to know about NATO and the nuclear weapons policy. The extensive footnotes and bibliography represent the desire to place debaters in contact with original sources. The "analysis" concept is designed to create a framework for the debater, coach, and judge from which specific cases are developed. The sources and arguments used in the text reflect the quality which can be expected this year. The *ERIC First Analysis* should serve as a strong foundation for a productive clash of ideas and sources in developing and extending educational issues.

The *ERIC First Analysis* of the 1982–83 National High School Debate Resolutions is published by the Speech Communication Association in cooperation with the Educational Resources Information Center Clearinghouse on Reading and Communication Skills (ERIC/RCS). The ERIC/RCS Clearinghouse is supported by the National Institute of Education which has as one of its missions the dissemination of knowledge to improve classroom practices. This ERIC information analysis paper is unique in that it is intended for direct use by high school students as well as by their teachers.

To be a "first" analysis, the manuscript must be prepared in a period of six weeks after the February announcement of the national debate topic. The author's thorough analysis of issues and sources in so short a time and his adaptation of the analysis to the needs of high school debaters are tributes to his experience and excellence as a forensics educator.

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# 1982–83 High School Debate Problem Area and Resolutions

What should be the level
of United States commitments
for national defense?

**Debate Resolutions**

*Resolved:* That the United States should significantly alter its nuclear weapons policy.

*Resolved:* That the United States should significantly reduce its commitment to NATO.

*Resolved:* That the United States should significantly curtail its arms sales to other countries.

# Preface

The purpose of this publication is to provide a brief overview of the 1982–83 high school debate resolutions. The decision-making process for selecting the problem area and resolutions is vastly different from the system used for determining the college debate topic. Last December, the National University Extension Association (NUEA) Committee on Discussion and Debate offered three problem areas and nine resolutions for consideration. After six weeks of balloting by the various state and national forensic leagues, the topic area of national defense commitments won the referendum. A final resolution, however, will not be determincd until December 1982, although an early preference has been shown for arms sales. All of the specific resolutions are closely related to each other and many case areas are interchangeable.

Whichever resolution is finally selected, the debater will have a tremendous amount of research material to assimilate. The four chapters of this book are intended to prepare debaters for their own efficient investigation of the problem area. The four chapters are: (1) getting started, a review of useful information on researching the topic of defense commitments; (2) the first resolution, nuclear weapons policy; (3) the second resolution, reduction of commitments to NATO; and (4) the third resolution, reduction of arms sales to other countries. At the end of the final chapter are footnotes for each chapter and selected bibliographies on the topic of national defense commitments.

Since this text is written early in the debate year, it can hardly encompass all possible cases which could be developed under any of the resolutions. This publication should be used to establish early research priorities on the most likely affirmative and negative arguments. Also, it is useful in providing a general overview of the kinds of issues likely to be discussed under the education topic.

The opinions expressed in this work do not represent the official position of either the NUEA or of the Speech Communication Association. In most instances the consensus view of debate theory or defense policy is presented, which may not represent the personal view of the author. As a general rule, this text emphasizes the practical rather than the exotic, the likely rather than the unlikely.

All the planning and directing of research assignments for this publication was done by the author. However, Carl Douma, a graduate student at California State University, Sacramento, was invaluable in securing documents,

offering suggestions on potential case arguments, and preparing material for the chapter on NATO. Editing and proofreading assistance was gratefully accepted from Christine Wagner. In addition, a special acknowledgment is due Doug Fraleigh, debate coach at CSU Sacramento, for his invaluable assistance in the preparation of Chapter Two on nuclear weapons policy.

The task of compiling the material and finishing the manuscript under rigorous time constraints has been made easier by the patience and understanding of both my family and the staff, students, and faculty of the Department of Communication Studies. It is hoped that the material provided in this publication will benefit debaters and coaches, and serve to introduce an exciting topic of vital importance to audiences and judges alike.

David L. Wagner

# 1 Getting Started

The next three chapters will provide information on the various aspects of contemporary issues involved in the discussion of United States military policy. Many of these concerns will be voiced in Congress and by the President during the upcoming year. While this publication should provide an overview of these issues, it is only the beginning of a lengthier process of gathering information on the debate topic. The debater must move beyond this general orientation and devise a research plan which will lead to an in-depth examination of the major arguments on this topic. Many debaters have failed to develop the library skills necessary for accumulating new evidence. The following sections will provide a brief review of a more systematic process for researching policy issues.

**The Beginning**

A basic first step in the process of library research is to develop a method for discovering those topic areas that require priority attention. This publication has encouraged the use of the "brainstorming" technique often used by business or academic groups to generate ideas. Such an approach is easily adapted to the needs of debate squads. Coaches and debaters should discuss possible case areas and issues which are likely to emerge on the military commitment topics. This exchange should encourage all members of the group to volunteer information or contribute their ideas. The rules are easy to establish: (1) evaluation and criticism by group members are forbidden, (2) all contributions are to be encouraged, (3) an attempt is made to create the greatest quantity of ideas, and (4) a combination of ideas and solutions is sought.[1] A list should be kept on concepts for cases, topicality arguments, and potential advantages.

This debate squad session does not have to be totally unstructured. It would probably enhance the quality of this exchange if a few general articles on current issues on military and foreign affairs were read first. Another preliminary step would be to review past debate topics for similarities to this year's resolution. For example, the 1980–81 college topic dealt with arms policy and the high school topic in 1979–80 dealt with U.S. foreign policy. Many of the issues raised under these topics will be argued again under the current approach. Finally, debaters should update responses to the generic disadvantages that seem to be applied to plans every year.

**Research Procedures**

Once a list of concepts has been accumulated, it becomes necessary to prioritize research assignments. A number of questions must be considered when making such assignments. Is it important to research an affirmative case first? What areas can be covered with the sources readily available? What cases are likely to be run early in the year? Answers to questions like these will determine which ideas must be considered high research objectives.

After a list has been developed, the most systematic method of researching is to compile bibliographies on each of the major issues. While some debaters are good at chasing down obscure footnotes in books or intuitively finding useful publications, the best and most comprehensive method is to consult the library card catalog for books and indexes for periodicals or journals.

**Indexes and Abstracts**

Most indexes or abstracts are organized topically by subject headings and by author. While an index will supply basic information on when and where an article was published, abstracts offer the added attraction of providing a short summary of the publication. Typical subject headings on the military commitments resolution would include: treaties, arms sales, defense, military assistance, NATO, disarmament, arms control, munitions.

*The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* is perhaps the most widely available resource index in the United States. Available in most public and school libraries, this research aid surveys over 150 popular magazines which cover issues with current news value. There are other more specialized indexes which should be consulted. A standard reference work for legal journals is the *Index to Legal Periodicals*. The *Public Affairs Information Service* (PAIS) has the advantage of abstracting both government and business publications. Two other respected indexes are the *Social Science Index* and the *Business Periodicals Index*.[2] Unlike recent debate topics on consumer interests and education policy, this topic area has no special indexes to render extra assistance. However, *The Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* is an indispensable guide to government reports. It will be an extremely valuable research aid for this year's topic.

Nationally distributed newspapers also provide indexes to their publications. The *New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Christian Science Monitor, Washington Post,* and *Wall Street Journal* are all respected papers with indexing systems available in many libraries. While most local newspapers will not have published indexes available, some libraries will clip articles on important topics. Also, Newsbank collects articles from local papers and places them on microfiche.

If this welter of reference material seems confusing, several options are available to the debater. First, most libraries have trained reference librarians who will offer assistance if requested. Second, various books explain reference

sources in greater detail. Good examples of this are *The New York Times Guide to Reference Materials*,[3] *Government Publications and Their Use*,[4] and *Guide to Reference Books*.[5] A third option is to pay to have a research service compile a bibliography on selected topics. A fee is charged by many university libraries or research organizations for computer retrieval of information.

## Sources

The preferred method for systematic research on any topic is extensive use of indexes or abstracts. However, a time lag exists between the publication date for journals or periodicals and their inclusion in various indexing schemes. Any of the three potential topic areas, especially those dealing with nuclear weapons and arms rules, has the potential for dramatic changes on a weekly basis. One way to ensure that research remains current is to examine unbound copies of such popular news weeklies as *Newsweek*, *Time*, *U.S. News and World Report*, and *Business Week*. Debaters should also read a copy of the local papers for timely information.

Other publications which may be less well known to the debater but are important sources of evidence include the *Congressional Record* which is the official account of the activities of Congress. During the summer months *Current History* devotes each issue to articles on the high school topic. *Facts on File* and *Editorial Research Reports* also cover current issues involved with military and foreign policy.

In addition to these publications, there are many works that contain a number of articles relating to the topic of defense. A sample would include:

*Astronautics and Aeronautics*. Published eleven times a year by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, this magazine often carries articles on aerospace issues. A current concern is the development of space weapons systems.

*Aviation Week and Space Technology*. This weekly publication of McGraw-Hill, Inc., is written for professionals in government and industry involved with aerospace and related technologies. This is an excellent source for current information on weapon sales.

*The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Published ten times a year by the Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, this publication offers a variety of articles on arms and nuclear weapons policy.

*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*. Published weekly by Congressional Quarterly, Inc., this report is a valuable guide to current issues facing the federal government. At irregular intervals discussions of major policy options are provided for analysis.

*Department of State Bulletin*. This official record of U.S. foreign policy provides information on developments of foreign relations by printing major addresses and statements of the President, Secretary of State, and senior department officials.

*Foreign Affairs*. Published five times annually by the Council on Foreign Relations, this scholarly journal is must reading for this year's topic.

*Foreign Policy*. Published quarterly by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, this journal contains major works on important foreign and military policy issues.

*The Futurist*. A bimonthly publication of the World Future Society; often contains articles on issues facing developing nations.

*Human Rights*. This quarterly journal is published by the ABA Press for the Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities of the American Bar Association and often contains articles on various legal issues which have an impact on military policy.

*International Affairs*. This quarterly publication of the Royal Institute of International Affairs offers a wide range of articles on foreign and military policy from the viewpoint of international scholars.

### *Primary Data*

Unlike the education topic which contained a large number of primary sources, this year's resolutions do not lend themselves to extensive primary research. One source which provides current information on budget matters is *The Federal Budget, Fiscal '82*. Statistical information is available from sources such as *Statistical Abstracts* and the *Information Please Almanac, 1982*. A variety of other almanacs are available which provide necessary information.

## Evidence Transcription

The final result of this research effort is the gathering of usable evidence to support arguments on issues raised during a debate. Actually, this statement should be refined to include the caveat that the evidence should meet commonly agreed upon standards. Among those tests of evidence mentioned by most authors are: (1) expertise of the author, (2) unbiased reporting of information, (3) timely information, and (4) verifiable sources of data.

In addition, full source citation should be available for each unit of evidence used in a debate. An increasing concern of those coaches involved with educational debate is the challenges to information introduced during debate rounds. It is the responsibility of contestants to become aware of the rules and regulations required by their leagues, state associations, and the National Forensic League on source citations and challenges to evidence. Some debaters carry copies of important affirmative and negative sources to immediately answer requests for clarification. A caution sounded in a prior *First Analysis* deserves repeating: "Particular problems often arise when evidence is paraphrased or when seemingly irrelevant information is edited out. As a general practice, this type of editing should be avoided."[6]

An example of a file card which contains a full citation is provided in Figure 1.

Figure 1

(1) D7e

(2) Will Buy from Others

(3) MATTHEW NIMETZ; (4) Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology; (5) Aviation Week & Space Technology; (6) Dec. 15, 1980, (7) p. 24.

(8) The evidence is that we're losing sales to other nations. Countries are going to other selling nations because of the delivery time involved. We lose in prestige and effectiveness when a relationship with the U.S. can't be translated quickly.

(9) DC.407

Figure 1. The numbers prefacing various parts of the sample card refer to the following: (1) code number of section for refiling, (2) brief synopsis of the content of the evidence, (3) author of quotation, (4) author's qualifications or experience, (5) source, (6) date of publication, (7) page, (8) one central concept of evidence, (9) initials of student researcher and consecutive number of total evidence cards researched by this debater.

The research process outlined in this chapter must continue throughout the year. Any topic will undergo substantial changes as the school year progresses. This topic, however, has even greater potential for dramatic shifts as budget cuts are made, arms talk begins, or military aid is debated in Congress.

Professor Henderson's warning on a prior foreign policy topic is still a valid observation:

> Those of you beginning to debate the new topic will want to broaden your reading, consider the implications of this first analysis, and discuss the potential implications with others. A debater should never rely on a narrow base of information, whether it be a compilation of viewpoints similar to *First Analysis*, a single news source such as a news magazine, a debate quote handbook, or the coach of a debate squad. Instead, the debater must broaden her or his understanding of the political context within which the subject is being debated, and then exhibit that understanding to the reasonable, prudent, thinking individual who serves as judge for the debate.[7]

Military policy is an important issue confronting all of us. Government decisions on nuclear weapons, defense of Europe, or arms sales have important consequences not only for the present but also for future generations. The public is becoming increasingly vocal in expressing their concern and fears about such policies.

Good luck during the coming year. If the following chapters establish the framework for formulating a systematic consideration of this topic, their purpose has been accomplished.

# 2. Nuclear Weapons Policy

*Resolved: That the United States should significantly alter its nuclear weapons policy.*

**Basic Concepts**

Nuclear weapons policy is one of the most consequential issues a debater can consider. The impact of a nuclear war would be devastating. As Admiral Gene La Roque recently outlined:

> If nuclear weapons are used in the next war, . . . the devastation and deaths will destroy civilization in the northern half of our planet and bring hunger and disease to Asia, Africa, and Latin America.[1]

Unprecedented death and disease would be exacerbated by the absence of medical personnel, and the ecological and greater consequences of a nuclear exchange could destroy all of human life.[2]

Given the frightening results of any nuclear attack, it is imperative that America select a nuclear weapons policy that minimizes the risk of nuclear war. The uniquely destructive nature of nuclear weapons is such that even a small reduction in the probability of nuclear war would establish a compelling advantage or disadvantage. Barry Blechman of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has noted that:

> Given the extraordinary uncertainty of nuclear war and the unprecedented potential of nuclear weapons for destruction . . . reducing the risk of war—even if only modestly, could be a crucial accomplishment.[3]

The consequence of avoiding nuclear war is clear. The question of whether present nuclear weapons policies are the best means of avoiding atomic warfare is much more debatable.

Present nuclear weapons policy seems premised on the theory that peace is best guaranteed through strength. The United States has the potential to deliver a devastating attack against the USSR or other potential adversaries. Altogether, the United States has over 9,200 nuclear warheads, with an explosive power of 3.5 to 5 billion tons of high explosive.[4] The yield of American weapons ranges up to 1,000 times the yield of the weapons that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II. The U.S. nuclear arsenal includes land- and submarine-based missiles, nuclear weapons delivered by manned bombers, and cruise missiles.

The United States presently has 1,052 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).[5] A mere 5 to 15 percent of these ICBMs could demolish many of the largest Soviet cities and most of the Russians' advanced industrial installations.[6] The retrofitting of existing missiles with Mark 12A warheads, and the ultimate addition of MX missiles to our nuclear forces, will increase the firepower and accuracy of American land-based missiles even further.[7]

The American land-based missiles are augmented by a formidable armada of submarines carrying nuclear warheads. The United States had 41 Poseidon and Polaris strategic missile submarines but this number has been reduced to 31 as older Polaris submarines have had their nuclear missiles removed.[8] The firepower of this submarine force is awesone. Fewer than half of the warheads on the submarines at sea could destroy the Soviet Union's 220 largest cities and 60 percent of their industry.[9] The U.S. nuclear submarine force is being further enhanced by the addition of Trident submarines. Somewhere between 8 and 25 Tridents will ultimately be deployed. The Trident packs considerable punch, with an accuracy equivalent to that of land-based ICBMs and the ability to destroy targets in Russia within 15 minutes of launch.[10]

The United States also has the ability to make a nuclear attack by air. Four hundred American bombers have the capability of dropping nuclear weapons on the USSR. American bombers have been modernized, and their penetration ability should be effective for another decade.[11] American bombers are also being equipped with cruise missiles; by 1987 it is estimated that 173 B-52 bombers will be equipped with over 3,000 cruise missiles.[12] These cruise missiles are very accurate and can be launched from outside Soviet territory.

Finally, beginning in 1983 the United States will deploy 464 ground-launched cruise missiles and 108 Pershing II missiles in Europe. Both missiles are highly accurate, and can hit Russian targets within 4 to 10 minutes of launch.[13]

The United States has a diverse and powerful nuclear arsenal. Many policy questions are presented by an arsenal of this size. Is the U.S. nuclear arsenal too large? Should the United States unilaterally act to limit its nuclear armaments, or should we demand reciprocal limitations by the Soviet Union and other countries before we take action? Is nuclear war best deterred by targeting our nuclear weapons against Soviet industry and cities or against Soviet military installations and missiles? Where should U.S. nuclear weapons be based? And should the United States take steps to protect itself against attacks by the USSR or other potential adversaries. The remaining sections of this chapter consider these and other pertinent questions of American nuclear weapons policy.

## Size of U.S. Nuclear Arsenal

### *The Arms Race*

The American nuclear arsenal is large, and present policy under the Reagan administration is to make it larger. President Reagan proposes spending $1.5

trillion on defense over the next five years, with portions of defense spending being devoted to a variety of additions to American's nuclear forces. Many in Congress concur with the President's desire to rearm America.[14] It can be argued by those seeking a limitation of nuclear armaments that American increases in nuclear weapons only encourage an arms race with the Soviet Union. Although the United States may well regard additions to its nuclear stockpile as defensive efforts to deter attacks on the United States or its allies, the Soviets tend to fear that U.S. increases are intended to enhance America's ability to launch a surprise attack on the USSR.[15] Because of this Soviet fear, some people argue that the Russians will match any American increase in atomic weaponry. Robert Lasch has contended that:

> For thirty years the arms race has been escalated unilaterally. Every major step up has been initiated by the U.S. and matched by the Soviet Union.[16]

One significant impact of an arms race is an increased risk of war. To some people new and more sophisticated weapons are usable in a "winnable" conflict with the Soviets.[17] American escalation of nuclear weapons production could also be interpreted by Moscow as evidence of unwillingness to cooperate. Such an adverse perception decreases the probability that political conflicts will be settled peacefully.[18]

The assumption that American nuclear superiority constitutes the best deterrent to Soviet attack has also been questioned. Michael Mandelbaum has indicated that the danger of reckless Soviet behavior is likely to come from feelings of weakness and strategic inferiority.[19] The Soviets did undertake one of their riskiest ventures—the Cuban missile crisis—at a time when the Russian nuclear arsenal lagged behind the United States.[20] Richard Barnet of the Institute for Policy Studies has noted that:

> [I]n the atmosphere of an intensifying and seemingly hopeless arms race, the choice may appear to be one between war now and war later. In that context, striking first may look like the only rational course.[21]

In addition to the risk of nuclear war, adverse domestic impacts result from an arms race. The military is the largest single consumer of energy, steel, water, and land.[22] Replacement of dollars spent on military items, with a heavy emphasis on armaments and munitions, by dollars spent in the civilian economy will increase employment. Since production in the civilian sector is more labor-intensive, one expert noted that "government spending on weapons yields only half as many jobs as comparable spending on housing, transit systems, or health services."[23] The armaments industry also preempts many talented scientists and engineers from pursuing research and development on domestic problems.

Of course there are balanced counterarguments to the hypothesis that increased nuclear weapons are harmful. One such argument is that as the number of nuclear weapons increases, the probability decreases that one more nuclear

breakthrough would upset the nuclear balance and make an attack attractive. In addition, a larger quantum of nuclear arms has a higher probability of surviving a nuclear attack at least partially intact than smaller arsenals would. It has been claimed that this increased survivability lowers the risk of accidentally going to war. If we know that part of our nuclear forces will survive even if the enemy does attack, no need exists to launch our forces when there is an ambiguous warning of a possible nuclear attack.[24] We would be able to wait and verify an enemy attack, secure in the knowledge that even if enemy missiles were in fact fired at our nuclear forces, enough of ours would survive to make a devastating counterattack.

The existence of large nuclear forces is also claimed to act as a deterrent to war, rather than a possible precipitating factor. Both the Americans and Soviets have been more cautious in their dealings with one another, desiring to avoid actions that might force the other to resort to atomic weapons. David Gompert of the Council on Foreign Relations has noted that "[c]risis avoidance has become a beacon of policy behavior by Americans and Soviet leaders."[25] The nuclear age has not seen unprecedented destruction which is testimony that the international system has learned to live with the bomb, and the purpose of nuclear strategy has been achieved.

It can even be argued that the risk of a nuclear war reduces the risk of conventional warfare. The threat of nuclear war by one or both parties either prevents conventional war from starting or helps limit the conflict. The nuclear threat, it may be argued, creates a greater pressure for negotiation through diplomatic channels. The prospect of escalation from conventional to nuclear war makes it unfeasible for the major powers to attempt to win political victories against each other by the use of conventional weapons. The fact that the 20 major confrontations since V-J day have gone to neither conventional nor nuclear war (except for China's volunteers who intervened in Korea) suggests that the nuclear deterrent has exercised an inhibiting effect.[26]

There are also negative arguments to rebut the claim that spending on weapons is economically counterproductive. Military appropriations are a stimulant for a depressed economy, and such appropriations are an important source of investment and profit for corporate America. It has also been noted that development of new military technology helps not only national security, but also a large number of other product areas that benefit from spin-off technologies derived from the defense-related development.[27]

## SALT II

One proposal to limit the arms race would require ratification of the SALT II treaty. This treaty has been agreed to by Moscow, but the United States has not ratified it. SALT II would limit both American and Soviet nuclear weapons delivery systems (ICBM launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers, heavy bombers, and airborne strategic ballistic missiles)

to 2,250. It also prevents increases in the launch weight of ICBMs and restricts development of new ICBMs and SLBMs.[28]

The Reagan administration has not been supportive of SALT II.[29] Indeed, the entire strategic arms limitation talks process has been interrupted. Up to now, the Soviets have voluntarily abided by the SALT II limitations. Unless America ratifies SALT II soon, it is doubtful that the USSR will continue to feel constrained by the treaty.[30] Soviet strategic programs are at a point where treaty limits could be exceeded rapidly once the Russians conclude the treaty will not be signed.[31]

Advocates of SALT II claim advantages from ratification. This treaty places many important restraints on U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons, restraints which could significantly stabilize the nuclear competition and lower the risk of nuclear war. At a time when U.S.–Soviet confrontation is acute, it is all the more important to reduce the nuclear component of the risks associated with conflict.[32]

If SALT II is ignored, a resurgent arms race could be the outcome. If the treaty is accepted, meaningful limits would be imposed on the Soviets as well as the United States, and nuclear forces would be balanced.

Opponents can attack SALT II and the arms control process from either a liberal or conservative perspective. Attacks on SALT II from the right have argued that it gives the Soviets many advantages. Admiral Zumwalt, former Chief of Naval Operations, argued that:

> By the time SALT II expires the Soviet Union will have about the same number of launchers and warheads and their rapidly improving accuracy will give them superiority in every other strategic nuclear measure. They will have five times our ICBM/submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) hard target kill capability, two times our area destructive capability, three times our megatonnage, and two times our throw weight.[33]

It has thus been contended that the SALT II limits put no effective limit on Soviet offensive nuclear capabilities, and that they change the status quo from strategic balance to a position of Russian nuclear superiority.

An additional problem generated by SALT II is the risk that the United States could not verify Soviet compliance with the terms of the treaty. Even if verification is technically possible, allegations of cheating are a typical by-product of the SALT verification processes. These allegations breed suspicion and mistrust,[34] and could actually lead to an increase in tensions beyond those present in a no-SALT world.

It is also possible to attack SALT II from a liberal perspective by contending that SALT II is useless or perhaps even counterproductive with respect to controlling atomic weapons. The United States already has a nuclear stockpile that can kill every Russian thirty-six times over. What difference would it make if SALT II prevented an increase in this capability? The problem stems from "the continuation of the arms race per se, not in the rate of escalation."[35] It has also been contended that SALT II increases armament. A state de-

partment specialist observed: "The idea around here is just to build up to the maximum allowed limits under SALT, because if we don't build up to it, we look bad."[36]

Another criticism of SALT is that it does not place comprehensive limits on all improvement of nuclear weapons; thus the arms race is merely rechanneled into directions not covered by the treaty.[37] SALT II could encourage a rechanneling of efforts into quality and accuracy improvements which actually increase the risk of a nuclear first strike.

**Weapons Freeze**

A currently popular position is to freeze current levels of nuclear weapons. The Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs has called for an immediate freeze on U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals, followed by substantial weapons reductions.[38] A grass roots drive to freeze nuclear weapons production is underway in the United States, and it has garnered Congressional support.[39]

In the world of debate an affirmative team can fiat such restrictions on the part of the United States. Because the topic does not call for change in Soviet nuclear policy, the affirmative cannot compel Russian compliance with proposals to restrict nuclear armaments. However, affirmatives can note that the Soviets would want to go along with such a plan. One argument is that the Soviets are not offensive-minded, rather, their buildup has been motivated by U.S. actions.[40]

If the Soviet arms buildup is merely a reaction to the American nuclear buildup, then their willingness to negotiate cutbacks would seem logical. The Soviet economy is sluggish and inefficient, and they could greatly benefit by transferring military expenditures to domestic investment and consumption needs. This factor also suggests that the USSR would be willing to negotiate substantial arms reductions. At least one authority has suggested that, under the present circumstances, the Russians would be willing to negotiate a sizable reduction.[41] This claim that the USSR is interested in significant nuclear arms reduction does not go uncontested. It is noted that the Soviets' goal is to achieve nuclear weapons dominance.[42] The USSR has no desire to abandon the advantages they have gained over the last decade. The theory that a lagging domestic economy would motivate Soviet arms control has also been questioned. Russian defense programs seem to proceed regardless of expenditures for civilian programs.[43]

Regardless of the Soviet response, the United States could substantially cut back on its nuclear arsenal without jeopardizing its national security. This unilateral American cutback would be followed by similar Russian cutbacks.[44] Some historical evidence suggests that Soviet reductions would be forthcoming. In 1963, President Kennedy initiated a limitation on nuclear testing, and this move was followed by a series of reciprocal weapons reductions.[45] However, it can also be asserted that unilateral American reductions are not a

successful strategy for arms control. It has been contended that the Russians understand only military power, and that historically they make no concessions unless confronted by strength.[46] The Soviets undertook a massive military buildup in reaction to the U.S. post-Vietnam military deceleration. In addition, current Soviet strategic buildup, 270 percent greater than that of the United States, is proof that the Russians are not responsive to U.S. efforts.[47]

## Nuclear Targeting

Two major options are possible for the targeting of American nuclear weapons. The first is a countervalue strategy, with nuclear missiles targeted against cities, industrial targets, energy-production facilities, and other civilian targets. The second option is a strategy including counterforce targeting. Counterforce strategy focuses on military targets, primarily the nuclear missiles of the opposition. Present policy is evolving in the direction of a counterforce strategy. President Carter promulgated Presidential Directive 59 (PD 59), which substituted the targeting of Soviet missiles for the targeting of Soviet cities.[48] The Reagan administration is also committed to counterforce-type weapons and a doctrine stressing the ability to fight a nuclear war.[49] As more accurate and reliable nuclear weapons such as the MX missile and Trident submarine are developed, it is anticipated that U.S. nuclear policies will increasingly be based on counterforce strategies.[50]

One problem with counterforce is that it could change our psychological view of nuclear arms from an ultimate deterrent to a war-fighting weapon, leading to a gradual acceptance of the possibility of war.[51] Counterforce targeting can have a very destabilizing effect. This strategy communicates to the Russians that we are prepared to use our nuclear weapons first, in an offensive note, since there would be little point in sending our missiles toward Soviet missile sites after they had launched their missiles against us. Because Soviet strategic submarines and bombers are not as formidable as their American counterparts, Soviet land-based ICBMs are the main component of their deterrent force.[52] Thus a significant threat to Russian ICBMs would be particularly frightening to the Soviets.

It can be argued that this Soviet fear exacerbates the risk of war for two reasons. In a crisis, the USSR may fear that the United States will preemptively attack the Soviet missiles. When this fear is present, an intense premium develops for striking first, before the Russian nuclear weapons can be attacked. This desire to preempt in a time of crisis could end up triggering a nuclear exchange. Counterforce targeting also increases the risk of accidental war. The fear of being subjected to a preemptive strike could encourage the Soviets to place their missiles on "hair-trigger" alert, prepared to "launch on warning" of an attack.[53] The Soviet warning system is less sophisticated than America's, affording their decision-makers limited time to decide whether an attack warning is true or a false alarm. This problem increases the risk of

accidental war, as launch-on-warning policies evolve into launch-on-suspicion policies.[54]

Proponents of counterforce targeting argue that it is a valid military option because targeting of only civilian cities deprives us of flexibility. The problem is not just one of deterring an attack against the United States. Instead, it has been pointed out that Soviet vital interests "are a relatively short tank drive from Kandahar or Leipzig, while ours are 3,700 miles away."[55] Since the United States cannot sustain a local nonnuclear balance in such locations, some other credible deterrent against a Soviet military move into Western Europe or the Persian Gulf is needed.

A nuclear attack against Soviet cities may not be a credible deterrent to Russian military actions. One reason is that there is a stable balance of forces at the level of all-out nuclear war; thus each side is relatively free to take military actions at lower levels of violence.[56] Former defense secretary Harold Brown has claimed that "only if we have the capability to respond realistically and effectively to an attack at a variety of levels can we . . . have the confidence necessary to a credible deterrent."[57]

Flexibility is also said to be important in the event of a threatened attack against the United States. In the event of a limited attack against American nuclear forces, a U.S. president may not be willing to respond by attacking Soviet cities, knowing that American cities would be subjected to nuclear attack in retaliation. This option would be vastly destructive to the United States, thus the Russians could embark on a limited nuclear attack on the assumption that the president would be paralyzed into inaction.[58] The change to a counterforce strategy provides an option to attack military targets instead of cities, and by shoring up deterrence across the entire spectrum of risk, reduces the likelihood of nuclear war.

Another possible justification for counterforce is the argument that the Soviet Union believes that a nuclear war could be fought and won.[59] It is claimed that the Russians are building a capability to knock out U.S. military and government command and control structures while preserving its own for use after a large nuclear exchange. Soviet civil defense, which could limit their losses to 40 percent of the population (less than their losses in World War II), may make the USSR confident enough of nuclear success to risk nuclear war. Pentagon officials have justified the targeting of U.S. missiles against Russian military targets on the ground that it would head off a Kremlin belief that the USSR can fight and win a nuclear war.[60]

**Basing of Nuclear Weapons**

American nuclear forces currently consist of land-based ICBMs, strategic missile submarines, and bombers outfitted with nuclear weapons. This three-fold defense system is often referred to as the Triad. Several justifications are advanced for the Triad concept. Unexpected failure of one leg of the system would be less harmful if two other options for retaliation remain. A

Triad also hedges against a Soviet technological breakthrough against one component of the system.[61] Furthermore, if one part of the system was deactivated, the Soviets would be able to increase their investment in methods to render the other two legs vulnerable. Given the importance of such a balanced system, several ways exist to improve the Triad's effectiveness.

*Land Basing*

One potential case would call for a strengthening of our ICBM force. It has been claimed that the Soviets can destroy over 90 percent of our ICBMs.[62] Soviet SS-18 missiles can deliver an explosive power equal to a million tons of TNT within one-tenth of a nautical mile of their target. Even hardened missile sites could not absorb such a blow; thus our missiles may no longer be survivable.[63]

This "window of ICBM vulnerability" could be very harmful. The ICBM force has been an important deterrent of nuclear war, and submarines and bombers are arguably much less effective as deterrents.[64] It has been claimed that abandoning our ICBM force would concede an important perceptual advantage to the USSR.[65] Furthermore, a vulnerable ICBM force might cause the adoption of a less stable launch-on-warning policy which would increase the risk of accidental war.

The MX missile has been held out as a means of closing the window of vulnerability. The MX is as large and capable as the Soviet SS-18, which threatens existing U.S. ICBMs. The Carter administration proposed construction of 4,600 different shelters, among which the 200 MX missiles would be shuttled.[66] The theory was that the Soviets could not attack all 4,600 shelters, and would not know which 200 contained the missiles. This approach had significant environmental risks, and it met with massive opposition from the states in which it was scheduled for deployment. It was also argued that the Soviets could simply target all 4,600 MX shelters and make the MX obsolete the day we complete it.[67]

The Reagan administration thus scrapped the MX shuttle proposal. It suggested deployment of MX missiles in existing silos instead, with the silos "super-hardened" against nuclear attack. The difficulty with this proposal is that it would not offer permanent protection; indeed, the hardened missile silo may be obsolete because of advanced technological development of missiles.[68]

Other basings have been suggested, but their efficacy is problematical. One suggestion was to place the missiles in the ocean, using flotation devices (the hydrolaunch concept). This deployment method has safety problems, however, and poses security risks in that an aggressor could gain access to the missiles.[69] Another suggestion was to place the MX missile on continuous airborne patrols. This approach has been argued to be very expensive and burdened by great environmental and safety difficulties.

Questions arise about the desirability of the MX missile as a weapon. The shelter mode, for example, would be very expensive. A study by the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) claimed that the Air Force estimate of $34 billion was much too low–$104 to $232 billion was a more realistic figure. Furthermore, the CEP's economic analysis suggested that spending on the MX would create fewer jobs per dollar than any of six alternate programs (e.g., residential construction or solar energy).[70]

*Sea Basing*

If an effective method of bolstering a land-based nuclear weapons force remains elusive, additions to our sea-based atomic forces may be considered. One proposal is the development of a Shallow Underwater Missile (SUM) system. SUM missiles would be based on small submarines. About 100 little subs could be built on short order, at a much lower cost than the MX racetrack system.[71] Each submarine could carry four Minuteman III missiles. (Minuteman III missiles are deployed on existing land-based ICBMs). Command, control, and communication with the submarines would be maintained at a level equivalent to that of land-based ICBMs.[72] Proponents claim that SUMs will be a largely invulnerable force. They would be hidden in huge stretches of water, so the enemy would not know their location. Because SUMs would be deployed close to shore, antisubmarine warfare technology would be rendered ineffective, and Soviet killer subs would have great difficulty reaching them.[73] Senator Hatfield asserted a major advantage of the SUM system:

> The Shallow Underwater Missile System (SUM) alternative will be fully deployed at least 3–4 years sooner than the MX system, thus solving the vulnerability problem of our ICBM force at the very time in the 1980's when the Soviet first-strike threat is expected to be severe.[74]

Opponents note several arguments against the SUM proposal concerning potential logistical difficulties. It has been claimed that SUMs do not have the structural strength necessary to carry missiles, and they would be torn apart in rough seas. Small submarines may lack the internal space required for the sonar, weapons control, and navigation systems that missile submarines need. Air Force officials argue that the communications link with SUMs would be inferior.[75]

Defending the SUMs could also be problematical. They would be slow and easily detectable, and their need to generate at periscope depth would increase their vulnerability to antisubmarine warfare.[76] The Defense Department also insisted that SUMs would be vulnerable to the Van Dorn effect—if the Soviets blanket the coastal waters with a barrage of nuclear warheads, a tsunami wave 50 feet high would be created, neutralizing the subs.[77]

There are other potential disadvantages to SUMs. SUMs could be provided with missiles with all the accuracy and firepower of the MX, adding yet another counterforce weapon to America's arsenal. If such U.S. submarines

are designed, a risk develops that the Soviets would do the same.[78] Three types of deadly Soviet missiles could easily be used in a Soviet SUM system. Finally, SUMs could be very expensive—$30 billion to construct, plus significant operating costs.[79]

A final nuclear-weapon-basing issue is what to do with the Trident submarine. Perhaps these strategic missile submarines should not be deployed. They are expensive, and their large size may make them more detectable. Yet, their firepower and accuracy make them uniquely dangerous counterforce weapons.[80] Tridents can patrol a wide area of ocean, making Soviet detection very difficult, and their speed and quietness help them avoid the slower Soviet antisubmarine warfare systems.

## Nuclear Testing

An affirmative team may wish to outlaw the testing of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has indicated a willingness to reach an agreement on the complete termination of all nuclear weapons tests.[81] An affirmative could mandate that the United States go along with this proposal and claim that most other nations would go along with the idea.[82]

Several advantages may be advanced for the ending of nuclear weapons testing. It would discourage a nation from making a nuclear first strike. A nation would need almost absolute confidence in its nuclear weapons before launching a nuclear attack, but without testing, a nation would have much less confidence in its weapons reliability. It has also been claimed that testing should be abolished because the development of more sophisticated weapons increases the risk of nuclear war.[83] By precluding development of new weapons, and demonstrating restraint on the part of the nuclear weapons states, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would slow the arms race.[84] Monitoring of such an agreement can be argued to be feasible at the present time— many scientists agree that seismological instruments can detect even low-yield nuclear explosions.[85]

Dan Caldwell notes the domestic advantages to a ban on weapons testing. Persons participating in weapons testing programs and people living near weapons test sites have been found to have an unusually high incidence of leukemia. Although the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) now prohibits tests in the atmosphere, underground tests sometimes release radioactive material into the atmosphere. A CTBT would minimize nuclear pollution and associated physical dangers.[86]

Several arguments are issued by opponents to a ban on nuclear testing. Many tests are now related to weapons safety, and nuclear testing has made significant contributions to weapons safety features.[87] Without recurrent tests there will be a loss of confidence in our nuclear weapons stockpile.[88] Deterioration would be likely within three to ten years in the absence of testing. This deterioration would leave the United States with ineffective and inferior

nuclear forces; even if the Russians complied strictly with a CTBT, they would come out on top because they have a preponderance of forces now.[89]

Another argument is that the USSR would violate a test ban treaty. Some evidence already suggests that they have violated test limitation treaties in the past.[90] The efficacy of seismological verification of covert underground tests is not universally accepted,[91] and laboratory testing may allow an undetectable means of treaty circumvention. If in the future the Soviets continued to test while we did not, they could gain a significant advantage. Finally, it is not clear that an American-Russian agreement to ban testing could stop testing worldwide. China and France would not be eager to forego testing, and potential new nuclear nations could still build first generation nuclear bombs without any testing.

**Accidental War**

America's first line of defense against a Soviet missile attack is a computerized early warning system. This system has been known to cause false alarms of impending Soviet attacks, with one such false alarm being caused by overheating of a 46-cent transistor chip in a North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) computer.[92] Such false alarms are a serious problem. Soviet missiles will reach American targets in 15 to 30 minutes, thus once warning of a Soviet launch is received there is little time for decision-making. Lloyd Dumas concludes that a major false warning during a time of high international tension could seem credible and result in a decision to fire American missiles in response. Such an incident would touch off an accidental nuclear war that neither side wanted.[93] A recent report by the House Government Operations Subcommittee concluded that our computerized early warning system is still dangerously outmoded and unreliable. The committee also called for urgent action to remedy the situation.[94]

Despite these claims, the Pentagon contends that a computer warning of a Soviet attack is intended only to cause U.S. forces to check other sensors such as satellites and radar to make sure that there is no Soviet attack. Since past computer warnings have been viewed skeptically, forces were put on only a low level alert.[95] Because none of the false alerts brought the United States even remotely close to nuclear war, it could be argued that the system works well. In addition to existing verification systems, President Reagan has announced a program to vastly improve our communications systems, thereby reducing the possibility of war based on misinformation.[96]

**Defensive Systems**

Thus far, this chapter has dealt with issues concerning America's offensive nuclear weapons force. However, defensive policies pertaining to nuclear forces are also pertinent to the nuclear weapons issue. Those supporting the resolution may choose to contend that American nuclear weapons policy

includes America's efforts to mitigate the risks caused by Soviet nuclear weapons. Or opponents of the resolution may wish to argue that the status quo can mitigate the harms of a nuclear attack by adopting defensive mechanisms.

*ABM*

Antiballistic missile (ABM) systems are one method to counter the threat of enemy nuclear weapons. One proposal by Clarence Robinson recommends a two-tiered antiballistic missile.[97] One tier would involve exoatmospheric interceptors equipped with nonnuclear warheads. These would be designed to intercept Soviet missiles in space. The second tier, using nuclear armed missiles and small radars, would be designed to destroy missiles within the earth's atmosphere. The basic technology for both tiers has been successfully tested by the Army's ballistic missile defense program.

Problems occur with ABM technology, however. An ABM system could encourage the other side to increase its offensive warheads since present technology can provide whatever number of warheads is necessary to overwhelm whatever number of antiballistic missiles are deployed. It has also been contended that ABM radar technology could not keep up with the ability of the Soviets to saturate the defense with penetration aids or decoys.[98] Prohibitively high costs are associated with building an ABM system designed to take out all incoming missiles.[99]

In spite of the inability of an ABM system to overcome a full-fledged Soviet nuclear attack, some advantages exist to ABMs. Even a partially successful system would ensure the United States of capability to launch part of its ICBM force. Because a small percentage of American ICBMs would be sufficient to eviscerate the USSR, an ABM system would not have to be totally successful to provide strong incentives for the Soviets not to attack. An ABM system could also be very effective against a lower-level nuclear weapons attack, caused by an accidental launch of a few missiles. In addition, conventional ABM technology has benefited from many recent advances in data processing and guidance systems, such as precision-guided interceptor missiles with on-board scanners and computers for automatic homing on attacking warheads.[100] These technological advances in guidance systems have been so effective that their use in the Falkland Islands fighting has raised questions about the suitability of the large naval ship.

*Space ABM*

Conventional antiballistic technology is not the only option available to the United States. Space-based laser antiballistic missile systems have been advocated as an alternative. By 1990, lasers capable of destroying an enemy's missiles could be on line.[101] These lasers would be inherently defensive, fit only to destroy weapons, not human life.

Test results defending the efficacy of a space-based laser ABM system can be found. A detailed defense department evaluation found that a force of 1,000 Soviet ballistic missiles could be engaged and destroyed by 25 laser battle stations.[102] A recent Heritage Foundation study concluded that satellites which fired conventional (nonnuclear) rockets at Soviet missiles could also be very effective.[103]

Counterarguments may be raised against space-based systems. Because an effective system would pose a real threat to other nations' ballistic missile systems, there is a risk that the system would be attacked while it is vulnerable during the embryonic stages of its deployment, possibly triggering an all-out war. The satellite platforms carrying the laser weapons would also be quite vulnerable.[104] The necessary aiming precisions required to intercept enemy rockets may also be lacking. Enemy missiles could also be hardened to protect against laser energy. Even if a space system were effective, the cost would be substantial—$30 to $100 billion, according to one estimate.[105]

Antiballistic missile systems of any kind are also argued to be destablizing. The keystone of deterrence theory is that the risk of retaliation discourages either side from initiating a nuclear attack. If the United States possessed an ABM system, it would destroy the credibility of the Soviet threat to retaliate. Strong incentives to launch a preemptive nuclear attack would therefore be created, and the probability of a nuclear war would be increased.[106] Alan Wolfe has argued that an ABM system "would bring the world closer to the possibility of nuclear war than any act contemplated by either the United States or the USSR since the decision to develop the hydrogen bomb."[107]

### *Civil Defense*

The final policy question to be discussed in this chapter is that of civil defense. It has been suggested by the Reagan administration that the United States establish an evacuation plan, to move people out of high risk areas during a nuclear crisis. Such a plan could increase the number of survivors after a full-scale nuclear exchange from 80–90 million to 140–150 million.[108] Other advantages beyond lifesaving have been claimed. Civil defense could lessen our vulnerability to Soviet coercion during a crisis. An evacuation of American citizens during a crisis would also demonstrate America's resolve and could deter further Soviet aggression.

Not everyone is convinced of the benefits of civil defense. Increased civil defense measures may create popular confidence that a nuclear war could be fought and won.[109] It has been claimed that "an evacuation plan would be more dangerous than no plan at all, because 'the more ready we are for nuclear war, the more likely its ultimate occurrence.' "[110] Even if people were relocated away from the sites of the nuclear explosion, the fallout would reach those who had been evacuated. A meaningful medical response would be impossible, and the economic and ecological fabric on which human life depends would be destroyed. Any extra survivors "saved" by evacuation

would only add to the overburden on our remaining resources, thus the ultimate level of death and injury would be increased.[111]

Evacuation of major cities is a questionable procedure. The resulting panic from either an announcement of an impending attack or an attack itself would lead to so many accidents that the roads would become impassable. In Washington D.C. the crash of Air Florida Flight #90 during a snowstorm intensified several hours of almost impassable conditions out of the city.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has considered many of the issues involved with U.S. nuclear weapons policy. These policies do not exist in isolation from other aspects of foreign policy or weapons sales. These other considerations will be discussed in the succeeding chapters.

# 3. NATO Commitments

*Resolved: That the United States should significantly reduce its commitment to NATO.*

**Basic Concepts**

This resolution includes many topics of concern for researchers on the other resolutions. NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is defined by that treaty and subsequent NATO actions. Two words with applications unique to this topic are critical in the understanding of the parameters of the resolution; they are *reduce*, and *commitment*. *Commitment* is commonly referred to as an "agreement or pledge to do something."[1] *Reduce* generally means to "lessen in any way, as in size, weight, amount, value, price, etc.; diminish."[2] *Reduce* also means "to lower, as in rank or position; demote, downgrade."[3] This meaning would allow the United States to reduce its commitment by a relative increase in the commitment of other countries. In other words, the United States' assuming a less dominating position within NATO would meet the requirements of this resolution.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed in response to Germany's defeat in World War II and the concomitant rise in power of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Eastern European Bloc. The organization followed the Brussels Treaty of 1948, which committed its signatory nations to give one another military aid and other assistance within their power in response to armed aggression in Europe. Belgium, Britain, France, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands were later joined by Italy and West Germany in the fifty-year treaty.[4]

NATO was formed in 1949 by a treaty signed by Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States. Other countries joined later: Greece and Turkey in 1952, and West Germany in 1955.

> The Treaty unites Western Europe and North America in a commitment to consult together if the security of any one member is threatened and to consider an armed attack against one as an attack against all, to be met by such action each of them deems necessary, "including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North American area."[5]

This resolution calls for the United States to reduce its commitment to NATO. In order to understand the implications of this resolution, an examination of the current status of NATO would be helpful.

**NATO Today**

Depending upon whom is consulted, NATO is either very much alive or almost incapacitated as a viable institution. Many of the problems of NATO can be traced to the weaknesses inherent in the world economy, the nature of defense decisions, and budget deficits in NATO. NATO countries, almost without exception, are democratic institutions responsible to the will of the people. It has been argued that:

> The neutralists (in Europe) have tried to construe NATO as primarily a military organization, with no basis except in the defense of its members. That is a pernicious lie. NATO is in the hands of Generals, but its Generals are not in their own hands. They are mandated by governments freely chosen by peoples. And these governments cannot for very long spend more money than their people want them to. Not so the government of the Soviet Union, whose defense budget requires nobody's approval.[6]

The antithesis to NATO is the Warsaw Pact which places on the borders of NATO countries an alliance of communist-bloc countries. The Soviet Union holds a central political, military, and economic position for the Warsaw Pact in ways similar to the United States and NATO. This structure has generated large defense expenditures for NATO and the Warsaw Pact by each side in response to the perceived threat from the other.

NATO in the coming decades may be faced with threats from several sources as it tries to maintain the original goals. The alliance has been accused of being out of step with the times. *Newsweek* contended last year that:

> On both sides of the Atlantic, NATO has lately been declared moribund. In a recent editorial, *The Economist* declared that the alliance was in "the early stages" of a "terminal illness," and in the *Washington Quarterly*, Theodore Draper suggests that "an alliance made in response to one set of conditions is coming apart in response to another . . . The Alliance of 1949 was not suited to the crises of 1979–80."[7]

The editor of *MacLean's* magazine insists that the basic problem stems from the very nature and assumptions upon which the organization operates. He states:

> . . . [T]he greatest long-term threat to NATO comes not from its enemies but from within. Despite U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig's most fervent efforts, the tidy allegiances of the postwar world are beginning to disintegrate, leaving most Western European statesmen, in the late Aneurin Bevan's memorable phrase, "writhing on the twin hooks of conscience and expediency." Even if *The Economist's* recent charge that "the Atlantic Alliance is in the early stages of what could be a terminal illness" is too harsh a judgement, the centrifugal forces tearing at NATO are growing stronger. No alliance can prosper when its members hold such radically differing views of the enemy it was established to fight. The consequences of the widening gulf in the European and American perceptions of the Kremlin's intentions are easier to recognize than to explain.[8]

Given this divergency, the need for change is evident. Pierre Lellouche, European Security Program advisor, explained in the spring of 1981 that: "Given its present internal contradictions, however, the Alliance can hardly be expected to last for another thirty years without either a major breakdown or a major transformation."[9] However, others think the word of NATO's demise is premature. These observers cite a long history of doom-saying and note that it has failed to come true. William Tapely Bennett, ambassador to NATO during the Carter administration, commented on the statement that the alliance was in disarray: "Someone made a study of that recently and found that since the establishment of NATO in 1949, every 14 months on an average, the alliance has been stated to be in disarray."[10]

Also the wide divergence in the attitudes of Western countries toward Russia reflects various interpretations of comparative military systems. Those urging an increased U.S. defense commitment note the disparity in the numbers of weapons, both nuclear and conventional, which separates the United States from the Soviet Union. Secretary of State Alexander Haig insists that the Soviets have enough nuclear weapons in aircraft and missile systems in Europe to give them a three-to-one advantage over the United States.[11] When conventional systems alone are considered, many commentators argue that "if a war in Europe were limited to conventional arms, the Soviets would be heavily favored to win."[12]

These policy analysts see the Soviet Union attempting to increase its political influence in the world by instituting a massive buildup of arms. However, other commentators have reached different conclusions, looking at the same data.

Some have argued that the Soviet Union is basically a peace-loving country. Thomas Kent stated in June of 1980 that "The Soviet Union is pressing a campaign for continued dialogue with the United States and Western Europe aimed at moving toward what one Soviet commentator calls 'a period of diplomacy after a period of anti-diplomacy.' "[13] *The Progressive* magazine insists that the Soviet buildup does not mean that the Soviet Union wants war:

> The Soviets have built an awesome military machine which almost rivals that of the U.S., but having achieved such great success by non-military means, they have no need to jeopardize tens of millions of Russian lives by resorting to military means. Soviet leaders are counting on the defeat of capitalism from within, not from without. And that is something entirely different from the image conjured up by American leaders, of Soviet troops seizing New York, Chicago, and L.A.[14]

Given this construct of NATO, there are several ways in which the United States can reduce its commitment to that organization. Since this publication provides an overview of the NATO topic and of possible case areas, conventional weapons (both troop reductions and conventional weapons policy), theater nuclear weapons, and the increased commitment by European nations will be considered.

**Troop Reduction**

One method for the United States to reduce its commitment to Europe is to withdraw some or all of the 300,000 troops currently stationed there. This approach concerns Europeans and others who argue that, without these forces stationed there, Warsaw Pact countries would be tempted to initiate military action. Therefore any reduction of troops should be justified in a manner which ensures continued survival of Europe. The analysis of troop strength starts with a comparison of the numbers of troops available for both sides.

*Forces*

Sheer numbers of NATO troops compare favorably with Warsaw Pact troop numbers. This comparison is based on interpretations of CIA estimates and other source data since the Warsaw Pact does not publish troop strength or positioning. In a study reported in greater detail later in this volume, Professors Morrison and Walker, of MIT and Harvard respectively, stated in 1978 this comparison of troop strength:

> When the above assignments (of Russian Troops to defend against China) are subtracted from a total USSR military establishment of 4,850,000, only about 2,100,000 Russian soldiers and airmen are available for a possible confrontation in Europe. It is a remarkable fact that out of its significantly smaller military force of 2,200,000 the U.S. has 1,900,000 available for such a confrontation.[15]

This calculation excludes NATO forces, which when added to this total bring NATO's number to 5.1 million men. In addition, Russia now faces China as a possible adversary, bringing the total troops facing the Warsaw Pact to 9.5 million.[16] Morrison and Walker also argue that because of differing objectives, large standing armies for NATO are unnecessary. They insist that large unilateral reduction in troop strength can be made without jeopardizing the ability to defend Europe. In fact, they conclude "NATO has organized a deterrent defense, with the result that most observers are satisfied there is a crude balance of forces along the frontiers of Europe."[17]

**Conventional Weapons**

The array of conventional weapons in the European theater of operations is extensive. In general, numerical comparisons indicate a large disparity between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. Warsaw Pact forces have available four times the number of tanks that NATO has, more planes, and more artillery. It is suggested that Warsaw Pact countries will be able to easily overwhelm NATO because of the disparity in the numbers involved. Robert Falls, who heads NATO's pivotal Military Committee states that "NATO strategy is to use nuclear weapons first if we are faced with overwhelming conventional odds, and if retreat or surrender are the only alternatives. At the moment we don't have enough of a conventional edge to alter that strategy."[18]

The implication is that ". . . NATO's response to any Soviet aggression, conventional or not, would rapidly and automatically escalate into a tactical nuclear exchange."[19]

### *NATO Superiority*

Not everyone agrees that NATO is inferior in conventional forces. Les Aspin, a Congressman on the Defense Appropriations Committee, argues with those people who insist that the United States has decreased its capabilities; instead he argues: "The United States has been advancing in a rather dramatic way over the past decade; . . . we have been doing as much as the Soviets have and far more cheaply."[20] *Military Balance*, a defense review, stated that the United States' and NATO's share of the $500 billion spent worldwide on defense amounts to 50 percent, exceeding the Warsaw Pact's 25 percent by a significant margin. An example cited by Sidney Lens and George Ott concerns surface military ships which is often cited as one of NATO's critically deficient areas. They state that the NATO countries exceed the Warsaw Pact by 490 ships to 270, and a 3 to 1 ratio in tonnage.[21]

In addition to numbers, qualitative differences exist between NATO and Warsaw materiel. It has been stated as axiomatic that the West holds a significant advantage in quality over the East, in every aspect of hardware.[22] NATO aircraft are outnumbered, but this difference is said to be compensated for by differences in training of personnel and in quality of aircraft.[23] This quality difference becomes even more significant when so-called "smart weapons" enter the discussion.

Smart weapons utilize the silicon computer chip common in computers and video toys to "think" an attack being fired upon by the enemy. These weapons can mechanically adjust to changing conditions and therefore increase the effectiveness of weapons. Such weapons have proved their value in the Middle East and the Falkland Islands. The availability of these weapons decreases the need for soldiers on the battlefield. The Boston Study Group contends:

> The adroit combination of small and sensitive sensors of many kinds, with effective computation and guidance made possible by miniaturized circuits, together with new explosives and new materials, offers the individual soldier or small teams of soldiers the odds on probability of being able to destroy with one shot a formidable target: a tank, an airplane, or even a ship.[24]

With smaller forces, a relatively inexpensive alternative is to develop more smart weapons used by fewer soldiers.

### *Outdated Concepts*

However, the assumption behind acquiring absolute superiority may fast be becoming obsolete. Soviet forces are fast becoming modernized, and as Edward Luttwak, senior fellow at the Georgetown Center for Strategic Studies,

stated in September 1980: The widespread presumption that the quality of American equipment is significantly higher than that of its Soviet counterparts is no longer justified in most cases.[25] However, given long lead times needed for the Soviets to readjust their forces to compensate for the quality difference, the West can continue its qualitative superiority with further changes in technology. Reppy, an economist at Cornell, and Long, a professor of science and society at the same institution, collaborated in the conclusion that: "It has become almost a truism within the military that the United States can maintain a military stalemate by being substantially ahead in technology even though the Soviets may be ahead in numbers of troops and deployed weapons."[26]

The Boston Study Group analysis states that unilateral reductions in both conventional and nuclear weapons systems would lead to reductions by the Soviets. While the topic of nuclear weapons will be explored in more detail shortly, it is important to note that the policy of reciprocal arms reduction is one that has been the subject of ongoing debate. The Reagan administration insists that in order to gain reductions by the Soviets, the United States must increase its weapons in order to bargain from a position of strength. Carl Von Weizsacker, former director of the Max Planck Institute of Preconditions of Human Life, agreed: "One painful truth history has taught us is that the Russians will make no concessions unless they are confronted with resolution and strength."[27] Soviet Union defense spending has been unwavering no matter what level of defense spending the United States has budgeted.[28] This difficulty of determining intent in negotiated or unilateral reduction in arms indicates one problem to be faced when considering weapons reductions. However, this resolution fails to state a mechanism for change. In other words, while the resolution that the "United States should significantly reduce its commitment to NATO" calls for change, nothing in the topic prevents bilateral reductions as the method of reduced commitment. Thus a position encouraging the Soviets to reduce their commitment might be shown to allow the United States to reduce its commitment as well.

*Standardization*

NATO's conventional weapon quality is not limited solely to aspects concerning individual weapon systems. Indeed, one of the major concerns of military planners is the interaction of these systems and the ability of countries to use the resupply systems of other member nations. Peter Newman states:

> . . . after more than three decades of trying, the Alliance still has not accomplished any significant weapons standardization. That sad failure means that in any conflict NATO's national forces simply could not resupply each other. Thirty-one different antitank weapons are currently in use, for example, along with 23 different families of tactical combat aircraft and 41 types of naval guns.[29]

If standardization were required for NATO countries, the United States could reduce its commitment to NATO simply by increasing the use of other weapons systems.

Some attempts are being made to standardize systems. The Defense Department under President Carter had standardization as one of its main objectives. Several agreements were entered into. "According to U.S. defense officials here at NATO, the effort to increase cooperation in the development of joint weapons systems has led to signing reciprocal defense procurement agreements, including dual production of certain weapons systems."[10] Recent examples include anti-tank missiles, munitions, and an air-to-air missile.[11]

**Nuclear Weapons**

Currently one of the most important issues facing Europe is the issue of nuclear weapons policy. Nuclear weapons come in many shapes and sizes, and are designed for many purposes. The critical genres of nuclear weapons most important to Europeans are those directly stationed in Europe. Reagan administration policy calls for the expansion of those nuclear weapons, or theater nukes, by the procurement of the Pershing II, the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), and the neutron bomb. Each item is said to fill a gap in current nuclear weapons vulnerability.

Now the Soviet Union is in the process of deploying the SS-20, a theater nuclear weapon that has a range of 2,300 miles and carries three warheads. The Reagan administration has released data indicating that it believes 300 of these missiles are now deployed, instead of the 250 usually reported in the press. In response, Brezhnev has frozen all deployments of the SS-20, stating that if the United States were to deploy the Pershing and the GLCM, Russia will deploy even larger systems with the capability of hitting the United States.[12] The Reagan administration states that the United States has no counterpart to the Soviet missile, and until the Pershing II and the GLCMs are deployed, NATO will be vulnerable. This is evident in Table 1.

**Table 1**

**A Balance of Forces?**

United States and NATO*

| Weapon | Number | Range in Miles |
|---|---|---|
| Pershing II IRBMs (proposed) | 108 | 1,000–1,500 |
| Ground-launched cruise missiles (proposed) | 464 | 1,500–2,000 |
| U.S. F-111 bombers | 156 | 3,000 |
| NATO F-4 jets | 334 | 700–800 |
| NATO F-104 jets | 425 | 800 |
| U.K. Vulcan bombers | 48 | 1,725 |
| Poseidon and Polaris submarine-launched missiles | classified | 2,850 |

Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact

| Weapon | Number | Range |
|---|---|---|
| SS-20 (three warheads) | 250+ | 2,300 |
| SS-4 | 340 | 1,100 |
| SS-5 | 40 | 2,150 |
| SU-19 jets | 480 | 720 |
| Backfire bombers | 65 | 3,100 |
| Badger bombers | 310 | 3,000–3,600 |
| Blinder bombers | 125 | 1,400 |

However, other sources cite the overwhelming advantage NATO has in short-range theater nukes such as nuclear artillery. The *World Press Review* cited the book review "Military Balance" which shows that of 40,000 nuclear warheads in the world, the West holds 30,000.[33] Of these, some 7,000 are in Europe.

*European Response*

Acceptance of increased deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe has come under fire. Over 850,000 demonstrators poured into the streets of five capitals of Europe in a burgeoning pacifist and antinuclear show of strength last October.[34] In Britain, the opposition Labor Party has indicated its displeasure with the deployment and promised to eliminate Britain's nuclear forces and ban NATO cruise missiles should they find themselves in power after the next election.[35] Another major deterrent to deployment is the German opposition. Germany has stated that they will allow the scheduled deployment of the bulk of the new forces only if one other continental nation also agrees to house the weapons. Holland and Belgium, of the five countries slated to receive the systems, are backing away from their commitment,[36] while, despite economic difficulties, Italy still remains committed.[37] However, in West Germany itself, opposition is mounting, with recent polls indicating as many as 50 percent of the populace opposed to the deployment of the weapons on German soil.[38]

The administration is banking on the opposition's dying out, and deploying the weapons on schedule.[39] This would allow Reagan to begin arms reduction talks from a position of strength, thus allowing an agreement on the reduction of weapons in the future.[40] However, this assumes the military necessity of long-range theater weapons. Given the likelihood that the use of long-range

theater nuclear weapons would call into play rapid escalation to full-scale nuclear war, deployment of more systems by the United States to fill this perceived imbalance may be unnecessary. Hence, to reduce U.S. commitment, one could prevent the deployment of unnecessary nuclear systems now likely to be deployed. Reliance would then be placed on other weapons systems discussed in the prior chapter.

*Weapons Reduction*

For the United States to reduce its nuclear commitment, it could also remove some of the nuclear weapons already in place or modify current policy which insists on using nuclear weapons during all confrontations in Europe. Lawrence Freedman, head of policy studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, explains:

> Even in the unlikely circumstance that NATO totally withdrew its threat of nuclear escalation, aggression would still represent an extremely unattractive and uncertain venture for the Soviets. Furthermore, in a crisis, preplanned measures of conventional reinforcements are far more suited to shoring up deterrence because they offer a way of signaling determination and reinforcing military positions without appearing unduly provocative to the adversary or domestic populations.[41]

To institute such a plan, Freedman suggests that NATO needs to demonstrate a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons:

> To complement a move to a more compelling conventional strategy, it would be necessary for NATO to find some tangible way to demonstrate a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The decisive and unequivocal reduction of short-range TNF (theater nuclear force) stockpiles would be a valuable step in this regard. Battlefield nuclear weapons represent current strategy at its most muddled and dangerous because they inhibit the development of convincing tactical doctrines, increase the fears of collateral damage from nuclear explosions, and are vulnerable to accusations of NATO preparing for a geographically confined nuclear war or of creating risks of premature nuclear escalation.[42]

This reduction of short-range theater nuclear weapons is also a reduced U.S. commitment, since "NATO has maintained battlefield nuclear weapons, despite widespread recognition of their military deficiencies, because they have become steeped in political symbolism. With LRTNF, they are supposed to confirm the American commitment to Western Europe."[43]

This uncertainty in the current nuclear policy is claimed by some as a major factor in preventing nuclear war. Because the Soviets do not now know exactly what will happen in the event of a theater nuclear exchange, they may be deterred from launching any strike at all, for risk of a full-fledged nuclear confrontation.[44] This uncertainty of policy also is promoted by the question over the actual use of military forces during a conflict. One suggestion that has been made would give Europeans control of the use of nuclear weapons,

a decision that may lessen the probability of nuclear war. The basis for this assumption is the belief that the Soviet Union would be less certain of a European nuclear response and would therefore avoid provocative action.

**European Commitment**

One final method to reduce U.S. commitment to NATO would be to increase the commitment for self defense by the Europeans. In this manner, even if the commitment by the United States does not change, or even increases, as long as the relative increase by the Europeans exceeds that of the United States, the relative U.S. commitment to NATO would then be reduced. Pierre Lellouche states the goals of such an approach:

> Today, our objective should be to reconcile the alliance with a genuine effort toward European defense cooperation. Gradually improving defense cooperation among the key European nations, in parallel to NATO, would:
> (1) encourage a greater European contribution and responsibility in the defense of the continent;
> (2) compensate for the decline of the credibility of the U.S. guarantee afforded within NATO; and
> (3) allow American resources and personnel necessary for the protection of vital Western interests to be used beyond NATO's territorial boundaries, as well as gradually open the way for a wider European military role in these regions.[45]

This commitment exists in Europe only to a limited extent. France and Great Britain with their independent nuclear forces provide a deterrent "more substantial than is sometimes supposed."[46] However, efforts at increasing cooperation are limited. Lellouche insists ". . . while each of the countries in question has gone through a major defense debate at one stage or another since 1978–9, this has not led to any serious attempt at developing intra-European defense cooperation as a means to fill the gaps left by the declining validity of the American Security Guarantee."[47]

Current economic relations hamper the prospects of leaving Europe in total or partial control of its own defense. West Germany, for instance, has become the leader in East-West trade, accounting for 22 percent of Russian trade with the West. Since the Afghan invasion, West Germany has increased exports to the Soviets by 30 percent.[48] Such trade dependency may be increased once the building of a natural gas pipeline from Siberia to the West is finished. President Reagan fears that the magnitude of the resultant trade increase will invite economic blackmail. A Western diplomat in Moscow commented: "The Russians will use the 'gas weapon' when it suits them, turning off the supply spigot in time of crisis."[49] Europeans are less pessimistic. They insist that economic dependency is a two-way street; any cutoff would cost the Soviets billions of dollars in foreign assets and would certainly limit any chance for future trade.[50]

The advantage of an increased European commitment to defense is a stronger Europe. George Ott contends that "announcing the withdrawal of American troops and subsidies from NATO would awaken Europeans to their need to be responsible for themselves, and perhaps . . . enhance its overall security."[51] A committed West could be awesome. "Not even the martial Soviet Society could produce superiority of such magnitude, if European NATO applied its wealth to its defense."[52]

**Conclusions**

Most of the debate within America appears concentrated on methods to increase NATO's ability to handle Soviet aggression. This debate generally has centered on the presumption that the U.S. commitment to NATO should be increased, rather than decreased. This chapter has noted some methods in which commitment can be enhanced albeit in differing directions from current policy.

# 4. Arms Sales

*Resolved: That the United States should significantly curtail its arms sales to other countries.*

## Basic Concepts

This resolution was the top vote-getter in the balloting on the general problem area of national defense commitments. Two important phrases which are essential to understanding this particular topic are "arms sales" and "other countries." Arms are usually considered synonymous with the concept of weapons. Such weapons are not only offensive or defensive systems but could arguably include logistical support or high technology components for such systems. Sales is a very specific form of arms transfer which involves "the exchange of property or ownership for money."[1] *Black's Law Dictionary* defines *sale* as:

> A contract between two parties, called, respectively, the "seller" (or vendor) and the "buyer" (or purchaser), by which the former, in consideration of the payment or promise of a certain price in money, transfers to the latter the title and the possession of property.[2]

The buyer or purchaser of these arms is another country. As traditionally defined by the United States in its treaties, a country is "the states of such country."[3] However, in a more general sense "the word is employed to denote the population, the nation, the state, or the government, having possession and domination over a territory."[4] This would seem to rule out sales to select groups within a country if these groups are not in power. Thus, the topic probably would not cover arms sales to Catholic extremists in Northern Ireland or rebel forces fighting the leftist government in Angola. Nor would private arms sales necessarily fall within the scope of this resolution. In addition, a variety of other answers for transferring weapons between nations will be discussed throughout this chapter. The next section will examine U.S. government aid programs.

## United States Security Assistance

One method for foreign countries to acquire U.S. arms is through foreign military aid, specifically through various programs associated with the security assistance program. Last year, the Reagan administration originally requested

a total of $1.7 billion in spending authorizations and $4.05 billion in arms loans for friendly countries. This represented a request for a $660 million increase in military aid and a billion dollar increase in loans over fiscal 1981's allocation. In its September 1981 budget revision the administration reduced its request to $1.1 billion in spending but kept its request for loan guarantees at $4.05 billion.[5] Congress finally authorized $1.1 billion in military aid spending, $3.3 billion in loans for fiscal 1981, and over $2.6 billion for the Economic Support Fund.[6]

Reagan's proposed budget for fiscal 1983 continues the trend toward more military aid and less economic assistance for foreign countries. The *Sacramento Bee* provides a synopsis of this request:

> Reagan has asked for $4.7 billion in security aid to friendly nations in 1983, an increase of $1.2 billion from this year.
>
> He also wants $5 million to start a new anti-terrorism training program to help foreign law enforcement authorities "combat international terrorism more effectively . . ."
>
> In addition to increased security assistance, there also would be an improvement in the financial terms of the aid.
>
> The budget gave no breakdown of what countries would receive aid.[7]

Before examining the specific components of the U.S. security assistance program, it may be useful to examine the rationale for the existence of such programs. James L. Buckley, the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, recently noted that:

> Security assistance programs contribute directly to the security of the United States in a number of specific ways.
>
> They bolster the military capabilities of our friends and allies, permitting them in some cases to undertake responsibilities which otherwise we ourselves might have to assume . . . .
>
> They contribute to the broad cooperative relationships we have established with many nations which permit either U.S. facilities on their territory or access by U.S. forces to their facilities in time of threat to mutual interests. U.S. defense expenditures would be immeasurably higher if we did not have overseas facilities available for emergency situations.
>
> They help our friends and allies provide for their own defense and furnish tangible evidence of our support for their independence and territorial integrity, thus deterring possible aggression. . . .
>
> They provide a means of demonstrating U.S. constancy and willingness to stay the course in support of nations whose continued survival constitutes a basic purpose of our foreign policy. Strong and unwavering support for the independence and security of Israel has been a hallmark of U.S. policy from administration to administration.
>
> They help alleviate the economic and social causes of instability and conflict. This is particularly important for countries whose necessary military expenditures would otherwise impose severe strains on their economies.[8]

*Foreign Military Sales*

Foreign Military Sales (FMS), through its foreign loan program, accounts for almost 80 percent of the approximately $1 billion allocated as a direct expenditure of funds for military aid. This category also contains several types of loans or credits which help allies finance weapons or military services purchased in the United States. At present, thirty-eight countries benefit from the FMS which "assists countries in which we have a security interest to meet their legitimate defense needs through the acquisition of needed defense articles and services, including training."[9] The bulk of such assistance, however, goes to Israel and Egypt, with smaller amounts to Greece, Turkey, Sudan, Spain, and Korea.

One needs to distinguish among the three types of FMS loans or credits. Forgiven loans are a special category of so-called loans appropriated directly by Congress with no repayment demanded. Since 1977, Israel has received an annual $500 million forgiven loan. Reagan has extended this program to include fifteen other key allies.[10] Regular guarantees account for the bulk of the loans under FMS. Congress authorizes the Defense Department "to guarantee repayment of loans from the Federal Financing Bank (FFB) to purchasers of U.S. arms and services."[11] These loans are repaid over 7 to 12 years, and the interest rate is generally higher than what the commercial market rate is, because a service charge of 0.125 percent is attached to each loan. Extended Repayment Guarantees are authorized by Congress and allow easier repayment terms for countries such as Egypt and Israel. "Recipients are given 30 years to repay the principal and interest on the loan and are allowed to pay interest only for the first 10 years."[12]

President Reagan has pressed for a program of direct U.S. government credits at interest rates as low as 3 percent for selected countries such as Egypt, Sudan, Turkey, Thailand, and Portugal. These countries are subject to severe economic pressures and mounting debt, and are also of great strategic value to the United States.[13] While Congress rejected this proposal last year, the administration has requested low interest financial arrangements as part of its fiscal 1983 budget.

*Economic Support Fund*

The Economic Support Fund (ESF) is designed to furnish support in the form of economic assistance via loans or grants to selected countries of special importance to the United States. The ESF can be used to fund "commodity import programs, capital development projects, balance of payments support, economic infrastructure, and programs aimed at reducing poverty in recipient nations."[14] The majority of the $2.6 billion in this fund will go to Israel ($785 million) and Egypt ($750 million), with two-thirds as grants and one-third as loan. Other aid will go to Turkey, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Jamaica, El Salvador, and the Philippines. ESF seeks to reduce the economic causes of social

instability, thus strengthening the nation's ability to thwart internal or external aggression and, by freeing indigenous funds, it allows countries to spend more on defense.

*Military Assistance and Training*

The final two categories of security assistance involve the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). MAP provides grants usually to countries such as Spain and the Philippines which provide the United States with military bases. Congress has been seeking to phase out this program for several years and has succeeded in significantly reducing its funding.[15] However, for those investigating the likely government response to a reduction on arms sales, the existence of a grant program such as MAP provides an alternate method for supplying allies with needed weapons.

IMET, in the judgment of our ambassadors, has been perhaps our most cost-effective security assistance program. Training and instruction are given to both military and military-related personnel from 72 countries at a total cost of under $50 million. Under Secretary of State Buckley notes the advantages of such a system:

> This training does far more than upgrade the military capabilities of allied and friendly nations. It also fosters long-range, close, and cooperative relationships with military and civilian leaders in a number of important countries, while exposing them to American democratic values and to the role of a professional military organization under civilian leadership and direction.[16]

Thus the security assistance program provides a combination of loans, grants, and financing schemes for foreign governments to secure U.S. weapons.

## Other Government Transfers

While the security assistance program is the major avenue for delivering weapons on a government-to-government basis, other ways allow the U.S. government to provide for the military equipment needs of friendly nations. Among the more frequently used methods which do not involve a sale of such equipment are: leases, drawdown, and reprogramming. Congress must be notified of the use of any of these devices and, in the case of leases or reprogramming, it can veto the proposed transfer.

*Leases*

Leases of equipment are based on a 1951 law (P.L. 82-155) which "allows the secretary of defense to lease U.S. defense equipment to anyone, whether a foreign government or a domestic corporation, for up to five years."[17] The

purpose of the law and potential abuses are explained by the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report:*

> The defense leasing law was enacted to let U.S. businesses and state and local governments get some use out of military factories and other property built up during World War II. But in recent years the leasing authority increasingly has been used to lease military equipment to other nations at no charge.
>
> The GAO said military equipment valued at $48.4 million was leased rent-free to Turkey, Honduras and the Dominican Republic in 1980. In January 1981, six helicopters valued at $5.9 million were leased rent-free to El Salvador.[18]

Despite congressional oversight provisions enacted in 1980, the International Security Subcommittee staff notes that "the leasing authority was being used to circumvent congressional controls over arms transfers and other military aid."[19] In response to this criticism, Congress enacted new restrictions on leasing in the fiscal year 1982 foreign aid budget:

> The new provisions placed leases of defense equipment under the same congressional controls and scrutiny as direct arms sales. Proposed leases of equipment valued at $14 million or more (or $50 million or more for a package of items) must be reported to Congress 30 days in advance and could be disapproved by Congress within the 30-day period.
>
> The president could override Congress' right to veto a lease by certifying that there was an emergency requiring the lease and that U.S. national security interests required it. Congressional review of leases would not apply to NATO or its members, Japan, Australia or New Zealand.[20]

In addition, the president would be required in each case to determine that there were "compelling foreign policy and national security reasons" for leasing rather than selling the equipment. In most cases, the president also would have to certify that the United States would recover all its costs in connection with a lease.[21]

*Drawdowns*

Emergency "drawdown" of military equipment is provided for under section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. International Security Subcommittee staffer Ivo Spalatin describes this mechanism. "The president can give allies small amounts of military aid under 'defense drawdown authority' in the Foreign Assistance Act and can waive most restrictions on aid in emergencies."[22] The president must certify that an emergency does exist. "Lt. Gen. Ernest Graves, director of the Defense Security Agency, added that under the drawdown authority, allies get equipment from U.S. military stocks and Congress must appropriate funds to replace the equipment."[23]

Recent Congressional action has increased from $50 million to $75 million the value of arms, equipment, or services the president can provide to a

foreign country in an emergency. This option has been exercised recently. Reagan used the drawdown authority "to provide military aid to El Salvador early in the year. Congress has no express power to block the president's use of the authority, but the president must report to Congress when he uses it."[24]

*Reprogramming*

While not really a separate mechanism for government transfer, reprogramming allows the executive branch to shift congressionally allocated funds from one account to another. The Appropriations Foreign Operations subcommittees get fifteen days' notice of the proposal to transfer funds and can veto such plans by expressing their disapproval.[25] In the past two years, ESF funds were reprogrammed to meet needs in Thailand, Liberia, and countries in the Caribbean, Persian Gulf, and Southwest Asian regions.[26]

Such requests are viewed by the Reagan administration as cumbersome and time consuming. The administration has asked Congress for a pool of unallocated money for use in responding to unforeseen emergencies. So far Congress has refused to authorize such expenditures.

**Commercial Sales**

In addition to those sales directly generated by government assistance, private manufacturers also export weapons to foreign countries. Congress recently repealed the $100 million limit on commercial weapons exports and amended the Arms Export Control Act "to require periodic review of the U.S. munitions list to determine which items on the list no longer warrant export controls."[27] An additional control on exports is the requirement to obtain a license from the Commerce Department for certain high technology items and weapons. Arms exports to certain nations, usually Communist-controlled, are forbidden. China was recently removed from this list, thus making it eligible to purchase a broader range of weapons.[28]

Arms sales have received the active encouragement of the Reagan administration. In a sharp break with President Carter's policy of restraint in such sales, within three months of taking office, the administration had promoted $15 billion in weapons sales to foreign countries.[29] According to the latest figures released by the State Department's Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the United States accounts for 33 percent of world weapons exports with a value of over $15 billion for fiscal 1979.[30] Saudi Arabia has become the United States' best customer, ordering $4.5 billion in military equipment for fiscal 1979–80.[31] Of total sales, according to James Buckley, "almost half of our military sales are to our NATO allies and Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. A large part of the balance is represented by support services and installations, such as the construction of port facilities, hospitals, and military academies and housing, as in our Saudi program."[32] Table 2 demonstrates the scope of U.S. weapons sales.

# Table 2

## U.S. Military Sales Deliveries and Military Assistance Deliveries to Foreign Governments, by Country, 1960 to 1979

**(In millions of dollars. For years ending June 30 except, beginning 1977, ending September 30. Represents Department of Defense military sales deliveries. Includes deliveries made under Military Assistance Program (MAP) and Military Assistance Service Funded Program (MASF), excludes training.)**

| Country | Military Sales Deliveries | | | | | | Military Assistance Deliveries | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1960–1969 | 1970–1979 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 | 1960–1969 | 1970–1979[1] | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 |
| Total | 6,718.2 | 40,471.6 | 4,439.7 | 7,074.7 | 7,732.1 | 7,399.4 | 14,687.4 | 17,430.5 | 235.7 | 108.1 | 228.3 | 170.7 |
| Argentina | 57.7 | 96.6 | 7.5 | 6.8 | 10.9 | 8.4 | 31.0 | 5.0 | — | — | — | — |
| Australia | 487.5 | 848.2 | 12.4 | 29.0 | 151.8 | 180.0 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Austria | 42.1 | 56.2 | 2.3 | 28.3 | 2.0 | 4.3 | 39.1 | (Z) | — | — | — | — |
| Belgium | 76.4 | 231.9 | 6.1 | 5.8 | 27.8 | 147.6 | 99.2 | — | — | — | — | — |
| Bolivia | 5 | 1.0 | 3 | (Z) | 1 | (Z) | 12.3 | 17.1 | 1.4 | 9 | 3.8 | .6 |
| Brazil | 61.9 | 184.3 | 40.2 | 8.5 | 8.0 | 8.7 | 120.8 | 8.3 | — | — | — | — |
| Canada | 308.2 | 605.3 | 76.0 | 66.2 | 73.6 | 76.9 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Chile | 18.5 | 150.3 | 24.0 | 56.0 | 11.2 | 8.2 | 48.4 | 4.0 | — | — | — | — |
| China (Taiwan) | 29.1 | 991.0 | 123.8 | 139.4 | 130.0 | 201.3 | 856.1 | 165.2 | 4.8 | 8.2 | 5.8 | .5 |
| Colombia | 2.6 | 18.3 | 1.0 | .9 | 2.0 | 5.1 | 58.9 | 6.3 | — | — | — | (Z) |
| Denmark | 52.0 | 133.9 | 9.2 | 19.9 | 12.2 | 17.7 | 174.4 | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dominican Rep | .9 | .6 | (Z) | (Z) | .1 | (Z) | 9.3 | 6.4 | .3 | .2 | (Z) | (Z) |
| Ecuador | 2.7 | 35.4 | 3.9 | 8.9 | 7.8 | 12.8 | 17.9 | 2.7 | — | — | — | — |
| Egypt | 1 | 281.9 | — | 10.5 | 50.8 | 220.5 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Ethiopia | 2 | 90.5 | 11.3 | 65.5 | — | — | 86.6 | 69.2 | 9.3 | 5.1 | — | — |
| France | 258.9 | 81.2 | 8.2 | 5.2 | 4.4 | 3.5 | 118.1 | — | — | — | — | — |
| Germany | 2,471.1 | 3,252.9 | 374.1 | 316.1 | 231.9 | 266.8 | 104.4 | — | — | — | — | — |
| Greece | 22.7 | 1,175.4 | 236.3 | 261.3 | 127.5 | 127.0 | 619.9 | 149.8 | .4 | .2 | .6 | 12.1 |
| Guatemala | 2.0 | 24.6 | 1.4 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 3.7 | 9.6 | 6.1 | .3 | .1 | (Z) | (Z) |
| Honduras | .2 | 8.1 | 4.7 | .4 | .5 | .9 | 3.3 | 1.7 | .1 | .2 | .2 | .1 |
| India | 19.3 | 12.8 | 2.6 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 86.7 | 3.6 | .3 | .1 | .2 | .1 |
| Indonesia | .6 | 57.8 | 2.8 | 25.4 | 6.3 | 6.3 | 47.6 | 94.4 | 9.9 | 7.0 | 9.5 | 6.7 |
| Iran[2] | 237.8 | 9,502.6 | 1,418.0 | 2,424.7 | 1,907.4 | 924.5 | 437.4 | 26.2 | — | — | — | — |
| Israel | 158.9 | 5,587.4 | 662.4 | 860.2 | 864.5 | 415.5 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Italy | 322.8 | 395.0 | 32.8 | 38.1 | 28.7 | 35.5 | 496.2 | — | — | — | — | — |
| Japan | 179.6 | 299.4 | 13.5 | 26.4 | 41.7 | 43.0 | 313.0 | — | — | — | — | — |
| Jordan | 74.7 | 527.6 | 57.5 | 103.9 | 108.4 | 77.7 | 39.5 | 284.2 | 47.6 | 7.6 | 63.7 | 42.3 |
| Kampuchea | — | — | — | — | — | — | 28.2 | 1,094.0 | — | — | — | — |
| Korea[3] | 2.2 | 1,259.5 | 136.5 | 177.8 | 414.1 | 417.6 | 1,597.1 | 2,085.6 | 91.5 | 15.3 | 26.2 | 18.1 |
| Kuwait | — | 469.3 | 12.3 | 157.8 | 190.7 | 96.3 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Laos | — | — | — | — | — | — | 413.1 | 1,002.7 | — | — | — | — |
| Lebanon | 1.7 | 24.4 | 1.4 | .4 | 8.4 | 5.3 | 1.4 | 5.2 | (Z) | — | — | — |
| Liberia | .4 | 3.0 | .7 | .4 | .1 | .6 | 4.4 | .8 | (Z) | (Z) | (Z) | (Z) |
| Libya | 17.3 | 12.3 | — | — | (Z) | — | 11.2 | (Z) | — | — | — | (Z) |
| Malaysia | 3.9 | 56.6 | 12.4 | 2.3 | 3.4 | 3.5 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Mexico | 8.2 | 8.3 | .7 | 3.6 | .5 | .4 | (Z) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Morocco | 9.8 | 297.4 | 12.5 | 31.8 | 88.4 | 133.1 | 28.3 | 1.3 | — | — | — | — |
| Netherlands | 74.3 | 284.0 | 15.4 | 20.2 | 53.4 | 92.9 | 163.1 | — | — | — | — | — |
| New Zealand | 52.8 | 73.6 | 1.3 | 3.2 | 4.3 | 6.0 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Nicaragua | .6 | 3.0 | .5 | .4 | .8 | (Z) | 3.2 | 3.6 | .2 | .1 | .3 | .1 |
| Nigeria | .4 | 23.0 | 1.4 | 2.0 | 5.9 | 5.9 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Norway | 101.9 | 238.4 | 18.0 | 31.4 | 28.7 | 24.3 | 269.8 | 5.6 | — | — | — | — |
| Pakistan | 40.3 | 218.8 | 13.1 | 39.5 | 46.7 | 61.3 | 301.1 | — | — | — | — | — |
| Panama | (Z) | 4.8 | .8 | .2 | .2 | .3 | 1.6 | 2.7 | .2 | .1 | .2 | .1 |
| Paraguay | .1 | .3 | (Z) | .2 | (Z) | (Z) | 4.3 | 4.8 | .6 | .3 | .3 | .1 |
| Peru | 16.4 | 110.0 | 28.5 | 26.1 | 13.7 | 11.9 | 50.3 | 1.6 | — | — | — | — |
| Philippines[3] | 3.5 | 122.7 | 12.9 | 32.3 | 34.6 | 26.7 | 200.4 | 121.4 | 11.7 | 4.3 | 12.0 | 6.5 |
| Portugal | 5.9 | 7.6 | .5 | .3 | 1.2 | .9 | 44.2 | 36.7 | .4 | 1.1 | 20.8 | 9.4 |
| Saudi Arabia | 126.6 | 8,449.1 | 644.3 | 1,501.5 | 2,369.2 | 2,521.1 | 13.4 | — | — | — | — | — |
| Singapore | .8 | 131.8 | 6.4 | 15.2 | 9.8 | 82.2 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| South Vietnam | (Z) | 1.2 | — | — | — | — | 3,634.1 | 10,784.2 | — | — | — | — |
| Spain | 60.0 | 624.2 | 80.8 | 164.9 | 59.1 | 98.1 | 249.8 | 76.1 | 2.6 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 2.1 |
| Sweden | 29.7 | 39.3 | 4 | 18.1 | 4.5 | 3.5 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Switzerland | 50.5 | 466.9 | 5.3 | 45.1 | 48.7 | 310.7 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Thailand[3] | 5 | 273.8 | 17.6 | 17.7 | 95.3 | 89.5 | 435.6 | 443.7 | 18.7 | 10.4 | 12.2 | 6.6 |
| Tunisia | 1.6 | 48.0 | 5 | 3.2 | 1.6 | 42.0 | 20.6 | 19.5 | 1.6 | .2 | .2 | .2 |
| Turkey | 1.5 | 553.2 | 103.5 | 35.0 | 159.6 | 132.8 | 1,110.1 | 507.4 | — | — | 6.4 | 16.9 |
| United Kingdom | 948.4 | 1,245.5 | 143.2 | 106.2 | 103.9 | 246.5 | 165.9 | — | — | — | — | — |
| Uruguay | 1.5 | 15.0 | 1.0 | 5.3 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 17.3 | 6.1 | .5 | .2 | .2 | .2 |
| Venezuela | 71.9 | 130.1 | 6.7 | 44.3 | 4.4 | 5.8 | (Z) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Yemen | — | 124.8 | .2 | 20.9 | 27.3 | 74.6 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Yugoslavia | 8.9 | 2.7 | .2 | 1.4 | .2 | .4 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Zaire | 1.4 | 44.5 | 2.8 | 7.4 | 10.9 | 4.2 | 20.0 | 3.3 | — | — | — | — |
| Other countries | 19.7 | 120.9 | .8 | 1.8 | 87.8 | 68.4 | 75.3 | 8.9 | .2 | .1 | .5 | .1 |
| International organizations | 160.5 | 305.4 | 24.7 | 47.7 | 40.3 | 34.4 | 1,593.9 | 367.1 | 33.2 | 44.8 | 63.7 | 48.1 |

—Represents zero. Z less than $50,000. [1]Includes transactions for the transition quarter July–Sept. 1976. [2]Change between 1978 and 1979 reflects values adjusted for cancellation and program reductions agreed to by the governments of the United States and Iran. [3]Includes MAP and MASF Programs for military assistance deliveries.

Source: U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts*, December 1979.

From *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1980*.

The goals to be achieved from such weapons sales were outlined in a Presidential Directive signed on July 8, 1981:

> The United States, therefore, views the transfer of conventional arms and other defense articles and services as an essential element of its global defense posture and an indispensable component of its foreign policy. Applied judiciously, arms transfers can:
>
> Help deter aggression by enhancing the states of preparedness of allies and friends;
>
> Increase our own Armed Forces' effectiveness by improving the ability of the United States, in concert with its friends and allies, to project power in response to threats posed by mutual adversaries;
>
> Support efforts to foster the ability of our forces to deploy and operate with those of our friends and allies, thereby strengthening and revitalizing our mutual security relationships;
>
> Demonstrate that the United States has an enduring interest in the security of its friends and partners and that it will not allow them to be at a military disadvantage;
>
> Foster regional and internal stability, thus encouraging peaceful resolution of disputes and evolutionary change; and
>
> Help to enhance U.S. defense production capabilities and efficiency.[33]

*Foreign Competition*

While the United States has a growing arms export business, other countries are also major exporters of weapons. The global trade in military equipment exceeds $30 billion a year. "Almost 80 percent of military equipment exported in 1978 went to the Third World—37 percent to the Middle East, 26 percent to Africa, 11 percent to Asia, and 5 percent to Latin America."[34] The four main weapon exporters in 1978 were: Soviet Union, 34 percent; United States, 33 percent; France, 7 percent; United Kingdom, 5 percent.[35] An increasingly important element in the arms business is the growing export of weapons from Third World countries. Frank Barnaby, director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, notes:

> Over the past decade, several developing countries have established significant defense industries producing armoured vehicles, missiles, aircraft and/or warships. The main Third World major arms producers are Argentina, Brazil, Israel, India, South Africa and Taiwan. We can expect more and more Third World arms producers to emerge as time goes on.
>
> The usual pattern is that countries establish defense industries and then attempt to sell the weapons they produce abroad.[36]

Table 3 provides information on the major buyers and sellers of arms.

## Table 3

**Value of Arms Exports and Imports, Supplier and Recipient Countries, in constant (1977) dollars: 1969 to 1978**

**(In millions of constant, 1977, dollars)**

| Country | 1969–1971 | 1972–1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | Country | 1969–1971 | 1972–1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| World, total[1] | 27,917 | 60,669 | 17,352 | 19,880 | 19,177 | Recipient Countries (cont.) | | | | | |
| Supplier | | | | | | Developing[1] | 19,541 | 43,693 | 12,940 | 15,185 | 15,537 |
| Canada | 881 | 704 | 127 | 70 | 74 | Algeria | 120 | 191 | 338 | 660 | 581 |
| China, Mainland | 902 | 1,876 | 148 | 110 | 130 | Brazil | 164 | 428 | 190 | 140 | 148 |
| Czechoslovakia | 521 | 1,550 | 465 | 600 | 744 | Cambodia | 173 | 1,019 | 5 | 10 | 17 |
| France | 865 | 5,799 | 1,058 | 1,300 | 1,256 | China, Taiwan | 1,074 | 509 | 169 | 180 | 176 |
| Germany, Fed. Rep. of | 646 | 1,574 | 687 | 850 | 814 | Cuba | 106 | 361 | 137 | 100 | 288 |
| Poland | 723 | 924 | 243 | 240 | 325 | Egypt | 1,696 | 2,579 | 158 | 220 | 214 |
| Soviet Union | 6,454 | 20,623 | 5,607 | 6,500 | 6,689 | Greece | 870 | 618 | 555 | 480 | 279 |
| United Kingdom | 711 | 2,719 | 820 | 950 | 1,024 | India | 733 | 969 | 518 | 725 | 290 |
| United States | 15,470 | 23,051 | 6,262 | 6,900 | 6,237 | Indonesia | 75 | 102 | 66 | 60 | 83 |
| Recipient Countries | | | | | | Iran | 1,074 | 5,996 | 2,221 | 2,400 | 1,955 |
| | | | | | | Iraq | 248 | 2,564 | 1,058 | 1,500 | 1,396 |
| | | | | | | Israel | 986 | 2,712 | 1,058 | 1,100 | 884 |
| | | | | | | Jordan | 263 | 257 | 148 | 120 | 158 |
| Developed[1] | 8,376 | 16,972 | 4,412 | 4,115 | 5,040 | Korea, North | 357 | 833 | 84 | 110 | 18 |
| Australia | 991 | 537 | 84 | 140 | 232 | Korea, Rep. of | 1,252 | 1,013 | 359 | 290 | 512 |
| Canada | 153 | 668 | 190 | 170 | 214 | Laos | 366 | 529 | (NA) | 40 | (NA) |
| Czechoslovakia | 170 | 1,471 | 317 | 250 | 302 | Libya | 270 | 1,437 | 1,058 | 1,200 | 1,766 |
| German Dem. Rep. | 602 | 2,231 | 581 | 500 | 270 | Nigeria | 62 | 178 | 52 | 10 | 37 |
| Germany, Fed. Rep. of | 1,179 | 1,155 | 955 | 470 | 209 | Pakistan | 294 | 560 | 201 | 220 | 158 |
| Hungary | 184 | 782 | 222 | 170 | 242 | Peru | 151 | 434 | 243 | 420 | 139 |
| Italy | 311 | 612 | 179 | 150 | 121 | Saudi Arabia | 204 | 953 | 497 | 925 | 930 |
| Japan | 322 | 370 | 190 | 130 | 158 | Spain | 287 | 557 | 190 | 290 | 102 |
| Poland | 933 | 1,742 | 412 | 370 | 149 | Syria | 334 | 3,559 | 555 | 775 | 768 |
| Romania | 184 | 668 | 148 | 170 | 223 | Turkey | 1,157 | 703 | 328 | 140 | 195 |
| Soviet Union | 925 | 1,221 | 402 | 525 | 768 | Vietnam, Socialist Rep. | 1,282 | 2,525 | 42 | 5 | — |
| United Kingdom | 747 | 470 | 253 | 150 | 139 | Vietnam, South | 4,105 | 7,559 | (2) | (2) | (2) |
| United States | 870 | 752 | 116 | 120 | 111 | | | | | | |

—Represents zero. NA = not available. [1]Includes countries not shown separately. [2]Absorbed by Vietnam Socialist Republic in 1976.

Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, annual.

From: *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1980*

This proliferation of weapons sellers poses serious problems. According to a new study from the Independent Council on Foreign Relations, the boom in conventional arms could:

> Undermine regional political balances in various parts of the world.
> Thwart allied diplomacy for mutual political goals.
> Weaken collaboration on defense within the Atlantic alliance.
> Inhibit the standardization of weapons within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.[57]

Despite these dangers, international arms sales will increase, according to this study, because of:

> Moscow's growing ability to deliver arms to distant places and the West's preference for sending military supplies instead of soldiers.
> The continuing rise of regional powers that seek arms to make their military power commensurate with their political and economic standing.
> Nuclear proliferation creating a more fragmented world in which local military power, in general, will be of greater importance within the Third World.[58]

*International Cooperation*

Given the intense competition among sellers of military equipment, unilateral restraint by one seller would not guarantee that the volume of sales would be reduced. The topic calls for U.S. government action and, as such, unilateral restraint may do little to reduce the quality or quantity of arms in the hands of Third World countries. Frank Barnaby concluded that this was the major reason why President Carter's sales restraints were ineffective:

> President Carter's efforts to control the arms trade were a tragic failure, mainly because the other main arms exporting nations (the Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom) not only refused to follow his lead but were more than willing to fill any markets vacated by the Americans.[39]

While most attention has been focused on a U.S.–USSR agreement on reduced arms sales, a more productive approach may be to encourage such an accord among the United States and Western Europe, notes Andrew Pierre, author of a Independent Council on Foreign Relations study. Agreements with the Soviets are long-term goals which "will be extremely difficult to achieve because the Soviets probably regard arms exports as their most valuable instrument in their struggle with the West."[40]

An additional need is for the Western allies to reach agreement on restricting the export of high technology to the Soviet Union. Such items often have dual civilian and military use. Direct and indirect applications make this area hard to monitor. Pressure from both business and the academic community creates problems for the government, while such restrictions are frequently perceived by civilian groups as beyond the scope of the government. Richard Perle, assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, concludes:

> There is now a consensus in the U.S. intelligence community that the Soviet Union's acquisition of highly accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles "was helped along significantly by their acquisition of Western technology," which permitted the missiles' deployment a year or two earlier, perhaps more, than would have been the case without it.[41]

**Co-production**

Co-production involves an agreement between the manufacturer of a weapon and the buyer to produce components or related items in the buyer's country. The United States currently has such agreements with Japan, Taiwan, Israel, and most of our NATO allies. The major types of co-production pacts include:

> divided responsibility for development which holds down research and development costs
> dual production of weapons
> separate component production for cooperative weapons systems.[42]

Increasingly, these arrangements are being used to sweeten arms deals and gain an advantage over the competition. In the early 1950s and '60s co-

production was seen as a way "to rebuild the European arms industry, promote the standardization of weaponry, and encourage popular support abroad for military spending."[43] Now, however, such agreements are viewed with concern because of the need to carefully monitor who has access to high technology weapons and the need to protect U.S. defense subcontractors from competition.[44]

An additional concern is that such arrangements may encourage export of weapons by third World nations. Frank Barnaby concludes:

> A new trend is a marked increase in production in and export from Third World countries. License production agreements with industrialized countries and various forms of technological assistance allowed some Third World countries to acquire the design capacity necessary for large-scale arms production.[45]

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency concurs with this assessment and also expresses the opinion that such pacts can circumvent sales restrictions:

> Western suppliers may further encourage arms exports from the developing world by entering into co-production agreements for more advanced weapons or using subsidiaries to negate export restrictions of their own home governments.[46]

Two recent examples highlight the issue of co-production. Defense officers in Egypt now indicate that "the price of doing business in Egypt for all military equipment, including air defense weapons, will be some form of participation in the production process to upgrade the technology base here."[47] Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, after a recent visit to the Middle East, indicated that the United States may enter into co-production deals with moderate Arab states. A newspaper account provides the rationale:

> Co-production is seen by American officials as one way of getting around the problem faced by moderate Arab states in accepting the United States as their main arms supplier: It ties them, in the minds of the more radical Arabs, to the main ally of Israel, the enemy of all Arab states.
>
> The problem is particularly acute in Saudi Arabia, which is seeking to assert leadership of the Arab world and thus is anxious to avoid a charge of having "sold out" the Arab cause by becoming too close to the United States.[48]

Severe complications that stem from co-production plans include the issue of what controls are to be placed on such weapons and the strong opposition of Israel, another country with whom the United States seeks co-production arrangements.[49] The entire area of co-production is one that deserves the close attention of those researching the arms sales topic. These pacts may serve as good examples of the type of sales which should be curtailed or, in another context, these deals are a means of circumventing sales restrictions by producing prohibited weapons in other countries.

**Arms Transfer Restrictions**

Congress traditionally exerts its power over foreign affairs through its ability to control expenditures. Military and security assistance as well as foreign economic aid have become favorite vehicles for demonstrating this control. Some regulations apply to all types of aid; other restrictions apply specifically to one country. Congress also requires the executive to issue nine reports each year on the status of aid receipts, the most notable of which is the annual report on human rights.

The most frequently discussed restrictions on aid are those which halt aid to nations that are violators of human rights. The Reagan administration has asked Congress to relax its grip on aid to friendly countries. Several South American nations, including Argentina, which the President considers vital to U.S. interests are currently prohibited from receiving aid because of human rights violations. The fiscal 1982 foreign aid authorization "reaffirmed congressional support for various laws that have been enacted to promote human rights. It also stated the sense of Congress that a strong commitment to human rights should continue to be a central feature of U.S. foreign policy."[50]

However, Congress did repeal the total prohibition on sales or aid in both Argentina and Chile. Such arms transfers would be allowed if the president certified that these countries were making significant progress in complying with human rights and that providing such aid would be in the national interest of our country. In addition, Chile must certify that it "was not aiding or abetting international terrorism and had taken steps to cooperate in the U.S. investigation of the 1976 slaying in Washington, D.C., of former Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier."[51]

This bill also prohibited arms sales or aid to any country which, in the opinion of the president, engaged in a consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment directed against individuals in the United States. This language was directed at Taiwan which was accused of such actions aimed at its nationals in this country. Haiti was also permitted to receive military aid if such aid is used to halt illegal emigration to the United States.[52]

*Prior Restrictions*

Numerous other aid restrictions carry over from prior aid bills. Among the more important is the 1976 Clark amendment "which requires that Congress approve—and thus effectively prohibits—any aid to forces in Angola."[53] Section 669 of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, the so-called Symington amendment, denies aid to nations pursuing the capacity to make nuclear weapons without international safeguards. This amendment was waived by Congress in 1981 so that Pakistan, which has been denied aid since 1979, could receive a six-year package of military aid. A related restriction, the Glenn amendment, provides for a ban on aid to nations who deal in nuclear

reprocessing technology or who detonate nuclear explosive devices.[54] The president can waive these nonproliferation restrictions which can be overruled by a joint resolution of Congress. As with any resolution, it is subject to presidential veto with two-thirds of each house needed to override. United States supplied arms may be used for self defense only and not for aggression against other countries. These restrictions "were stated in the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (PL 87-195) and the 1968 Foreign Military Sales Act (PL 90-629). The 1968 law said any nation 'in substantial violation' of the law 'shall be immediately ineligible' for further arms."[55] For some people the use of these arms to control domestic strife violates the defensive use concept. Aggression against their own people creates serious ethical problems.

In 1976 these legal restrictions were modified to require the president to report to Congress if a violation of law may have occurred. As the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* notes:

> The weapons supply would be cut off only if the president or Congress (by joint resolution) found that a violation actually had occurred.
>
> Even in that case, the president could continue to supply arms to a nation that had violated U.S. law if he found that a cutoff "would have significant adverse impact on United States security." Congress could override that decision by passing a joint resolution.[56]

Despite repeated violations by Israel and Morocco, the only country to suffer an arms embargo was Turkey, who used U.S. weapons in its 1974 invasion of Cyprus. This embargo was lifted in 1978.

Congress has also given itself the right to veto major arms sales. The recent attempts in Congress to veto the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia demonstrates the difficulty of exercising this option. Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (PL 94-329) requires the president to notify Congress of major arms sales before a formal sales offer can be proffered. Congress has never blocked a sale, but even if it did, the president can waive this veto if he justifies that "an emergency exists which requires such sales in the national security interests of the United States."[57]

*Effectiveness*

The effectiveness of these congressional restrictions is subject to doubt. Initially, since Congress passed these statutes, it can also modify or revoke them. This was demonstrated most recently by the exemption granted Pakistan from the Symington amendment and the reversal of the ban on arms aid to Chile and Argentina. Second, most of these laws allow the executive a waiver in emergencies or provide for presidential veto of congressional intent. Third, some restrictions are counterproductive. For example, nations resented the imposition of human rights standards by the United States. Bernard Feld notes:

> External intervention is not welcomed by any sovereign state, not even (or perhaps especially) if it comes from the most powerful country on Earth.

> Nor, in a nation with as many diverse interests and internal pressures as ours, is there any single criterion for choosing one's "friends" from the many diverse elements striving for power on this anarchic globe.[58]

On the other hand, the attempts to enforce restrictions harmed U.S. interests. James Buckley argues that Carter's policies weakened U.S. influence over the arms policy of other nations. Carter's policies led to a deterioration of U.S. military and strategic positions, he claimed. Coupled with congressional human rights and nuclear proliferation restrictions on arms transfers, Buckley said, Carter's policies undercut the capabilities of nations to defend themselves—nations in whom the United States has "the most immediate and urgent self-interest. Pakistan is a spectacular case in point."[59]

The debater researching this topic should investigate the impact of such aid and sales requirements since they serve as empirical examples of what could occur if the resolution were adopted. Similarly, those seeking potential reasons to adopt the resolution calling for curtailment of arms sales should examine the effectiveness of status quo restrictions in areas such as human rights, nonproliferation, technology transfer, and co-production. Certainly fertile ground exists for case developments in those areas.

## Case Studies

A review of the literature on arms sales reveals a sophisticated clash on the basic issues involved in this discussion. Among the more commonly documented advantages of continued sales are:

1. U.S. sales provide leverage for the United States to influence the actions of recipient nations.
2. Arms sales reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation by providing conventional weapons security to recipient nations.
3. Sales exert a positive and needed impact on our balance of payments.
4. Sales and aid allow military equipment manufacturers to achieve economies of scale, keep production lines open, and lower cost of weapons systems.
5. If hostilities do break out, the selling nation can mediate the disagreement because of its control over spare parts and munitions.
6. Sales and aid strengthen recipient nations, thus decreasing the likelihood of U.S. troop involvement in defense of friendly allies.
7. If the United States does not supply requested weapons, other exporting countries will meet the demand with fewer restrictions on weapon use.

Also significant reasons are offered to support arguments which favor reducing arms sales. The more commonly cited reasons are:

1. Arms sales create regional arms races and instability which leads to war between neighboring countries.

2. Sales support the dictatorial power of right wing regimes which violate human rights. These violations cannot be socially justified.
3. Sales and aid supply weapons to suppress popular movements for liberation with recipient nations.
4. The United States becomes identified with support of unpopular leaders which triggers resentment and backlash when new leaders take over.
5. Sales and aid often require advisors to train the troops of buying nations. This can escalate to U.S. combat troops protecting our interests if advisors become the target of guerrilla attacks.
6. Money used to purchase weapons could be better spent on projects to alleviate poverty or promote economic growth in Third World countries.
7. Military sales or aid can help nations acquire the delivery capability to launch nuclear weapons. Some of this sophisticated equipment can be purchased only from the United States.

Perhaps the best method for reviewing the interaction of these advantages and disadvantages is to examine case studies of actual aid and sales programs. While each request for military equipment is unique, a review of the factors involved with arms sales to China, Pakistan, and Latin America will illustrate many of the issues outlined in this chapter.

**China**

During the last half of the 1970s the People's Republic of China (PRC) "embarked on a program of military modernization, a central aspect of which is the acquisition of arms and military-related technology from the West."[60] While the current market is depressed due to stringent military budget cuts in China,[61] the long-term outlook is more favorable. As Professors Tow and Stuart note:

> Barring an unexpected reversal in global political trends or alignments, China can be expected to continue to pursue a strategy of gradually acquiring selected NATO and Japanese weapons systems and related military technology in order to effectively maintain this minimum deterrence posture. China's shopping list will be seriously limited, however, by overall economic constraints and by the low priority accorded to defense by the current Beijing leadership.[62]

The United States has enjoyed good relations with the PRC since the early 1970s. Secretary of State Haig has recently recounted the value of strong ties to China by arguing that the one force that has restrained Vietnamese aggressiveness has been "the People's Republic of China, and the threat that North Vietnam feels from the Chinese forces on their northern border." He added, "Too frequently today . . . we neglect to take full weight of the strategic importance of the American relationship with the People's Republic of China."[63] Arms export policy has been changed to reflect this reality. Ambassador John Holdridge notes some recent changes:

> We decided to liberalize further our export controls over dual-use technology sales to China and, perhaps more importantly, to implement the new procedures effectively.
>
> We are considering possible legislative changes to amend U.S. laws which treat China as a member of the Soviet bloc. We intend to work closely with the Congress on this.
>
> We concluded that we should revise the regulations on international traffic in arms to permit the licensing of commercial sales to China on a case by case basis.[64]

By mid 1980, the United States had relaxed restraints on the export of both civilian and military technology items. This policy revision had an immediate impact:

> By October 1980, over 500 export licenses (each exceeding $150,000) for dual-use technology and military support equipment had been approved by Washington and by the beginning of 1981, another eighty-five technology-export licenses, which would have been rejected under the older "Y" classification, were being re-evaluated by the Commerce Department as well.
>
> A second important American policy revision was also announced in mid-1980. In the future, American firms will be permitted to build on-site factories in China to construct helicopters, computer equipment, tactical defense radar sets, weapons-testing equipment, and communications equipment.[65]

The United States has even talked about the possible sale of weapons to China.

What makes these arms sales discussions with the PRC awkward is that the United States also supplies weapons to the Republic of China (ROC) or Taiwan. The Communists in Peking (Běijing) contend that the United States, "in recognizing them as the government of China in 1979 and in ending official ties with the Nationalists on Taiwan, gave up the right to sell arms to Taiwan."[66] However, routine small-scale deliveries of defensive equipment have continued to Taiwan.

> The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (HR 2479—PL 96-8), passed after President Carter restored relations with the PRC, requires the United States to "make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." The act said the United States would decide what weapons were sufficient for Taiwan.
>
> Carter observed a moratorium on new arms sales to Taiwan during 1979, but new sales of standard military items were resumed in 1980.[67]

The ROC requested permission to purchase more sophisticated fighter planes. "Unable to match Peking's quantity of aircraft, Taiwan has compensated by maintaining a qualitative edge, which ROC officials argue will be lost eventually if Taiwan does not acquire fighters more advanced than the F-5E."[68] Peking's position is described in a recent news article:

> Peking says it will never be able to persuade Taiwan to unify peacefully with the mainland so long as the United States provides arms to Taiwan. It wants the United States to announce an elimination of arms sales over a set period—say, five years.[69]

President Reagan decided not to sell advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan, but he did agree to extend Taiwan's co-production agreement for the less advanced F-5E. This decision satisfied no one. Peking felt backed into a corner. *Aviation Week and Space Technology* reports:

> China's growing opposition to any U.S. arms sales to Taiwan was not ameliorated by the White House decision.
>
> The Chinese government lodged "a strong protest" and declared it would "never accept any unilateral decision made by the U.S. government."[70]

The *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* summarized the view of a source very knowledgeable on Taiwan:

> "Taiwan needed the advanced fighter to maintain its qualitative air superiority in the Taiwan Straits, and it needed the advanced fighter as a symbol of continuing American support, to ensure confidence in the international business community as to Taiwan's continued security," the source said. "That's very important to them because they have an export economy and they're very, very dependent on foreign investment. If anything should shake the confidence of investors, the economy of the ROC would take a nosedive."[71]

The repercussions are still being felt. China's disapproval has been expressed in news articles and by foot-dragging on talks with the United States. The United States fears that this rift could destroy the fragile relationship with China and drive the PRC into an alliance with the Soviet Union. News commentaries from Peking indicate that such a move is not being contemplated.

> An authoritative commentary carried Tuesday by the official news agency Xinhua rejected the possibility that Peking would improve relations with Moscow. The commentary was considered significant because it countered arguments that China has a so-called "Soviet card" to play against the United States in negotiations on the Taiwan question.[72]

Thus, the debater researching this topic must examine not only the prospect for arms sales to China but also the continuing problems associated with the current approach to arming Taiwan. Both areas offer interesting cases for examination and illustrate the inherent difficulty with shifting foreign policy positions.

*Pakistan*

In 1979 President Carter cut off aid to Pakistan under the provisions of the Symington amendment. The United States' attitude toward Pakistan changed after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Jane Coon, deputy assistant secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, concludes:

> The Soviets, through their invasion of Afghanistan, have demonstrated their willingness to intervene militarily in Southwest Asia. The Soviet Army is now on the border of the populous Indian subcontinent, and Pakistan is a front-line state. The Soviet pressure on Pakistan is real, and the implications are far-reaching throughout South and Southwest Asia. Pakistan stands on the eastern flank of the Persian Gulf.[73]

An initial Carter offer of a $400 million two-year aid package was rejected by Pakistan President Muhammad Zia ul-Haq who called it "peanuts."[74] The Reagan administration developed a more substantial assistance proposal:

> The United States and Pakistan discussed the dimensions of an overall framework for American efforts to assist Pakistan over the next 6 years. This includes a program of cash military sales during this year. It also includes a 5-year program of economic support funds, development assistance, and loans for foreign military sales—the total value of which is expected to be approximately $3 billion, subject to annual approval by the U.S. Congress.
>
> The multiyear approach is in response to the seriousness and immediacy of the threat to Pakistan's security. The United States has agreed to the sale of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan to assist Pakistan to improve its air defense capabilities.[75]

James Buckley explained the purpose behind the military sales:

> The intention is twofold: to give incursions and limited cross-border threats from Soviet-backed Afghan forces, and to keep the Soviets from thinking they can coerce and subvert Pakistan with impunity.[76]

Surprisingly few objections appeared in Congress to this aid pact. Congressman Stephen Solarz, Chairman of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, explained:

> The basic issue was not debated because, after months of considering it, "There is more or less of a consensus that, with 85,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan and two million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, we have a real interest in providing economic and military assistance."[77]

Some concern was expressed that the F-16s might be too sophisticated for Pakistan's needs or that such a sale would upset the balance of power between India and Pakistan. A final concern was that the waiver of the Symington amendment would encourage nuclear weapons development.

Buckley explained that the F-16 was a proven aircraft which would serve Pakistan's needs for fifteen to twenty years. He assured Congress that the balance of power would not be upset since India had a five-to-one advantage in modern aircraft and was acquiring additional Soviet and French aircraft. On the issue of nuclear weapons, "The administration had argued that the best way to get Pakistan to drop its efforts to develop nuclear weapons would be to bolster it enough militarily to make Pakistani President Muhammad Zia ul-Haq feel secure from outside threats."[78] The case of arms sales to Pakistan illustrates both the potential advantages and feared disadvantages of weapons

transfer. Yet another example is provided with an examination of sales to Latin America.

*Latin America*

Latin America and the Caribbean basin have been singled out for increased U.S. economic and military assistance. The Reagan administration is convinced that Cuban and Soviet backed revolutionaries have embarked on a campaign of guerrilla warfare throughout Central America. The decision to renew aid to Chile and Argentina with the required certification that these nations are making progress toward securing human rights marks a dramatic shift from President Carter's foreign policy priorities. Such a shift will find the United States assisting rightist governments.

El Salvador is the most recent example of a large infusion of military and economic aid and U.S. military advisors. These advisors are of special concern to Clarence Long, the chair of the House Foreign Operations Committee. Long believes:

> Sending U.S. advisors to El Salvador risks American casualties that could deepen U.S. involvement and lead to "another Vietnam."
>
> He and other critics of Reagan's policy have argued that it relies too heavily on military aid, rather than the economic aid they contend could alleviate El Salvador's economic problems and remove the impetus for leftist revolution.[79]

The basic problem, as recognized by the Reagan administration, is to convince Moscow, Cuba, and Cuban armed insurgents to cease their activities. *Business Week* concedes that this will be a difficult chore:

> But short of physically forestalling Cuban intervention, the U.S. faces the same prospect it did in Vietnam, where it was pulled into a muddled political situation little by little, unable to control the external source of the aggression. The decision in late February to send additional U.S. military advisors to El Salvador to help the junta repulse external aggression is likely to be only the first step in an escalation unless Washington persuades Fidel Castro and his Soviet sponsors to back off.[80]

Broader foreign policy goals were also behind the decision to renew aid to Argentina. While indicating that the current leadership of this nation is improving the human rights situation, the administration has argued that lifting the arms ban "is critical to improving relations with Argentina, which boosted its grain sales to the Soviet Union in 1980 against U.S. wishes after President Carter declared a grain embargo in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan."[81] In addition, supporters of the President's proposal requested that the "quiet diplomacy" approach should be tried to promote human rights. A similar argument was offered to justify renewed aid to Chile. James Bushnell, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, noted:

> In the case of Chile, we believe that our interests, including human rights, are best served by a less confrontational approach than has char-

> acterized policy in recent years. In the months ahead I expect there will be further steps to accord Chile equitable and evenhanded treatment.[82]

Another reason was that Chile's needs were being met by other countries. Bushnell concludes:

> The burden of the 1979 determination has fallen, however, on U.S. exporters, and thus on U.S. trade and jobs. The United States has no monopoly in supplying goods and services and has been placed at a competitive disadvantage in the rapidly growing market in Chile.[83]

The United States also has announced plans to offer economic aid to Bolivia and limited military aid to Guatemala. Aid was restricted to both nations because of human rights violations. Another country that has requested military assistance is Venezuela which believes Cuba is exploiting a border dispute with Guyana. Venezuela has asked for F-16 fighters to upgrade their air force—a request which if granted, will upset the balance of power with Colombia, another neighbor of Venezuela.

Thus, existing military equipment aid as well as proposed sales demonstrate many of the general issues surrounding arms transfer policy. As this topic is researched, the debater will find countless other examples of arms sales which justify a more restrictive policy. Sales to the Middle East, the Philippines, Morocco, Indonesia, Nigeria, and other countries deserve close screening.

## Conclusion

The arms sales topic will involve the debater in examining both sales to individual countries and sales to groups of countries exhibiting similar behavior. An investigation of this resolution will require a critical examination of major aspects of both foreign and military policy. Long-standing assumptions about U.S. relationships to friendly and hostile governments should be put to the test. This chapter should aid this investigation by providing information on the scope of United States arms sales.

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